

ZISA
ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH AFRICA
1987 - 1993

Eine Studie des Weltfriedensdienstes im Rahmen des
Zivilen Friedensdienstes

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I. Einleitung

Südafrika war über Jahrzehnte, seitdem die burisch dominierte Nationalpartei nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg an die Regierung gekommen war und die Rassentrennung systematisch verschärfte, ein festgefahrenes politisches System. Die Möglichkeit, dass sich das Apartheidsystem in Südafrika innerhalb weniger Jahre in eine „Regenbogen-Gesellschaft“ mit einer schwarzen Mehrheitsregierung transformieren würde, war lange Zeit überhaupt nicht vorstellbar.

Eine wichtige, aber bisher kaum beachtete Institution, die beim friedlichen Übergang in Südafrika eine wichtige Rolle spielte, war das Zimbabwe Institute for Southern Africa – ZISA. Es entstand 1987, nachdem sich weiße Südafrikaner aus dem liberalen Spektrum (unter ihnen Frederik van Zyl Slabbert und Alex Boraine) mit Vertretern des ANC (unter ihnen Thabo Mbeki) in der senegalesischen Hauptstadt getroffen hatten. Nach ihrer Rückkehr von der historischen Konferenz in Dakar, wurde beschlossen, einen anhaltenden Dialogprozess zwischen Vertretern der Befreiungsbewegungen und Meinungsführern aus allen gesellschaftlichen Kreisen Südafrikas in Gang zu setzen. Die Treffen fanden in Zimbabwe statt, mit der Organisation wurde der Cold Comfort Farm Trust (CCFT) betraut, ZISA wurde gegründet.

Über 50 Treffen wurden ab 1987 durchgeführt. ZISA verstand sich als „facilitator“ der Dialogveranstaltungen. Eine weitere Aufgabe von ZISA bestand darin, Informationen über die aktuelle politische Situation in Südafrika zusammenzutragen. Die Arbeit von ZISA wurde bisher weder dokumentiert, noch in irgendeiner Weise aufgearbeitet. Der Weltfriedensdienst entschloss sich daher im Jahre 2009 im Programm des Zivilen Friedensdienstes (ZFD) eine vom BMZ finanzierte Studie zu erstellen, um die Rolle, die ZISA für den Transformationsprozess in Südafrika gespielt hat, näher zu beleuchten. Dabei ging es vor allem um die Frage, inwieweit die Methoden von ZISA auf andere Konfliktsituationen – zum Beispiel im Rahmen des Zivilen Friedensdienstes – übertragbar sind. Dazu wurden in Südafrika mit ehemaligen TeilnehmerInnen der ZISA-Treffen Interviews geführt. Mit der Durchführung dieser Interviews wurde die Journalistin und Autorin Ruth Weiss betraut, die selbst zum Team der ZISA-MitarbeiterInnen gehörte und deshalb einen besonderen Zugang zu den Gesprächsteilnehmern herstellen konnte. Dank ihrer jahrzehntelangen Erfahrung als Journalistin und in ihrer Eigenschaft als Zeitzugin konnte Ruth Weiss entscheidend zum Gelingen des Vorhabens beitragen.

Das Projekt wurde in Deutschland von einem Beirat begleitet, der sich aus VertreterInnen des Arnold-Bergstraesser-Instituts, des Berghof Forschungszentrums für konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung, sowie den Südafrika-Experten Dr. Konrad Melchers, Dr. Helmut Orbon und dem Botschafter a.D. Harald Ganns zusammensetzte.

Der vorliegende Bericht von Ruth Weiss und die Analyse von Karen Johnne, basierend auf zwölf Interviews mit beteiligten Akteuren, haben wichtige Aspekte im Aufarbeitungsprozess der Transformation von Apartheid zu einem demokratischen Südafrika beleuchtet. Eine gute Grundlage, um mit Beteiligten aus Südafrika und Fachleuten aus dem Arbeitsfeld der zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung in Deutschland das Thema Dialogveranstaltungen weiter zu bearbeiten.

Manfred Schumacher-Just
Projektkoordinator, WFD

ANALYSE DES PROJEKTS
ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (ZISA)
HARARE 1987 – 1993

KURZBERICHT

RUTH WEISS

März 2010

Hintergrund

Die Geschichte Südafrikas ist seit der Ankunft der holländischen Siedler im Jahre 1652 von Gewalt geprägt: bereits die Begegnung mit den Khoi-Khoi Ureinwohnern endete in einem Krieg. Kurz nach der Ankunft der Weißen begann mit der ‚Einfuhr‘ von Indonesiern, später auch einigen Schwarzen, die Sklavengesellschaft, die erst 1834 nach der 1815 Übernahme des Kaps von den Briten beendet wurde. Es folgten die sogenannten Kaffernkriege des 19. Jahrhunderts zwischen der Kapkolonie und den schwarzen Völkern, sowie die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Buren und Briten. Die Verfassung von 1909, die 1910 zur Gründung der Union von Südafrika zwischen zwei Buren-Republiken und zwei britischen Kolonien führte, war ein Kompromiss zwischen Buren und Briten, der unweigerlich zu Gewalt führen musste, da es keine gleiche Wahlberechtigung für alle Rassen gab – für Weiße, Schwarze und sogenannte Farbige. Nur im Kap wurde jedem (Mann) weiterhin das Wahlrecht eingeräumt, das später weiter eingegrenzt und zuletzt abgeschafft wurde.

Friedliche Proteste der schwarzen Mehrheit durch die 1912 entstandene Partei African National Congress (ANC) trafen stets auf Ablehnung, bis zur und vor allem nach der Einführung der Apartheid, der gesetzlichen Rassentrennung, im Jahre 1948. Kurz nach einem Massaker friedlicher Demonstranten in Sharpeville und vor dem Verbot des ANC sowie des 1959 gegründeten Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), flüchtete der ANC Präsident Oliver Tambo ins Ausland. Ein Jahr später kündigte der ANC zusammen mit der bereits 1950 verbotenen Kommunistischen Partei, die Gründung des ANC Militärflügels, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) an.

In den 60er Jahren reagierte die Regierung in Pretoria mit Festnahmen und verschärften Gesetzen gegen Apartheidgegner. Im Jahre 1964 wurden Nelson Mandela und andere ANC Führer zu lebenslänglicher Haft verurteilt. Das Black Consciousness Movement (BCM, Bewegung des Schwarzen Bewusstseins) stieß gegen Ende des Jahrzehnts in das entstandene politische Vakuum. In den 70er Jahren wurde ein Aufstand Jugendlicher im Johannesburger Vorort Soweto blutig niedergeschlagen, danach standen die schwarzen Townships in Flammen. In den 80er Jahren verschärfte sich der Konflikt. In der sogenannten Verfassungsreform Präsident P.W. Bothas waren die Afrikaner erneut übergangen worden. Botha führte einen „totalen Krieg“ gegen die Region, um ANC Kämpfern (die im Exil lebten), den Zugang zu Südafrika zu verweigern.

Der internationale Protest gegen die Apartheid nahm zu. Internationale Sanktionen wurden gegen Südafrika verhängt, sodass Südafrikas Wirtschaft unter zunehmenden Druck geriet. Mit der sich anbahnenden neuen Politik in der Sowjetunion gegen Ende der 80er Jahre verlor Pretoria seinen Wert für die westlichen Staaten, die nun stärkeren Druck zur Beendigung der Apartheid ausübten, während der ANC nicht mehr auf Moskaus Unterstützung rechnen konnte. Unter diesen Umständen schien eine Annäherung/Einigung möglich zu sein.

Dabei ist zu beachten, dass in internen Dokumenten des geheimen Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), der lange die Politik der Nationalen Partei Regierung bestimmte, bereits 1986 zugegeben wurde, die Apartheid hätte das Ziel, die Zukunft des

Afrikaanertums zu sichern, nicht erreicht. In einem weiteren Dokument von 1989 akzeptierte der Afrikaner Broederbond, dass ein Schwarzer Präsident Südafrikas werden könnte.

DIPLOMATISCHE SCHRITTE

Nelson Mandela, der 1982 aus Robben Island auf das Festland in das Pollsmoor Gefängnis verlegt wurde, begann 1985 mit der Regierung Kontakt aufzunehmen, ein Kontakt, der vom National Intelligence Service (NIS) weiter fortgeführt wurde. Im Jahr 1989 wurde Mandela von Präsident P.W. Botha zu einem Gespräch eingeladen. Das Angebot einer Freilassung wies Mandela jedoch zurück. Er war nicht bereit, den bewaffneten Kampf – Vorbedingung für seine Freilassung – aufzugeben. Nur freie Menschen könnten verhandeln, erklärte Mandela, der darauf bestand, die Regierung müsse nicht mit ihm, sondern mit dem ANC verhandeln. Im Jahr 1988 wurde Mandela ins Victor Verster Gefängnis verlegt, sodass er mit der Außenwelt Kontakt aufnehmen konnte. Es schien nur eine Frage der Zeit, ehe er entlassen werden würde.

Ab 1985 bemühten sich verschiedene Regierungen, Organisationen und Einzelpersonen darum, Gespräche zwischen dem ANC und Pretoria zu initiieren.

Die Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) kam mehrmals nach Südafrika, besuchte auch Mandela im Gefängnis und schlug Bedingungen vor, die zu einer Einigung führen sollten. Weitere Versuche, Kontakte herzustellen scheiterten, da Pretoria noch während der Anwesenheit der EPG in Südafrika, militärische Anschläge auf ANC Ziele in den Nachbarländern verübte.

Ab 1985 wurde das ANC Hauptquartier in Sambias Hauptstadt Lusaka zum Mekka unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsführer. Mitte 1985 besuchte eine Delegation einflussreicher südafrikanischer Geschäftsleute Sambia, angeführt von Gavin Relly, dem Vorsitzenden der Anglo American Corporation, um sich mit der ANC Führerschaft in Mafuwe zu treffen. Auch andere, wie der Philosophieprofessor van der Merwe, versuchten, Kontakt zwischen dem ANC und Pretoria herzustellen.

Eine der wichtigsten Gesprächsrunden wurden ab 1988 (über drei Jahre hinweg und unter Mitwissen des NIS) in Mells Park in Großbritannien abgehalten – zwischen Professor Willie Esterhuyse und dem ANC, vertreten vor allem von Thabo Mbeki, damals Leiter der ANC Presseabteilung, später Nachfolger von Mandela als Staatspräsident. Diese Gespräche waren Gegenstand des 2009 entstandenen britischen Spielfilms „Endgame“. Ab 1989 fanden Gespräche u.a. in der Schweiz, zwischen dem ANC und NIS statt.

Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA)

Außerhalb von Begegnungen mit Regierungsbeteiligung wurde 1987 eine wichtige Initiative gestartet, die die ehemaligen Parlamentarier, Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert und Dr. Alex Boraine ins Leben riefen. Sie konnten zum ersten Mal ein Treffen zwischen führenden ANC Mitgliedern und wichtigen weißen – in der Mehrheit afrikaanssprachigen – Südafrikanern im Senegal im Juli 1987 organisieren. Slabbert und Boraine hatten 1986 eine Stiftung gegründet: IDASA. Organisiert von IDASA traf sich in Dakar eine Delegation von 61 Südafrikanern mit einer ANC Delegation

unter Thabo Mbeki.

Nach den erfolgreichen Gesprächen reisten Dr. van Zyl Slabbert und Thabo Mbeki nach Harare, um Präsident Mugabe zu bitten, ihnen die Fortsetzung der Gespräche in Zimbabwe zu ermöglichen. Offiziell konnte Mugabe der Bitte wegen des auch von ihm unterschriebenen Boykotts gegen Südafrika nicht entsprechen. Allerdings wurde einer NRO, Cold Comfort Farm Trust (CCFT), die der Regierung nahe stand, erlaubt, auf ihrem Farmgelände eine neue Organisation einzurichten: Das Zimbabwe Institute for Southern Africa (ZISA), das diese Aufgabe durchführen sollte.

Das „Projekt ZISA“ ist Gegenstand einer Untersuchung, die der Weltfriedensdienst im Jahr 2010 durchgeführt hat. In dieser Untersuchung sollte festgestellt werden, ob die Arbeit, die von ZISA geleistet wurde, erfolgreich war und ob Ansatz und Methoden in anderen Konfliktsituationen Anwendung finden können.

ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE ON SOUTH AFRICA (ZISA)

Didymus Mutasa, CCFT Vorsitzender und damaliger Parlamentspräsident Zimbabwes (noch heute einflussreich als Minister im Büro des Staatspräsidenten), veranlasste die Erweiterung eines Farmgebäudes für ZISA, in dem auch CCFTs Verwalter sein Büro hatte, der mit ZISA zusammenarbeitete. Den ZISA-Direktorposten bot Mutasa Dr. Helmut Orbon an, bislang DED Beauftragter, der die Stelle annahm. Weitere Mitarbeiter wurden die Journalisten Moeletsi Mbeki (Bruder von Thabo Mbeki), Ruth Weiss, Mike Overmeyer und Peter Welman. (Mike Overmeyer und Peter Welman sind mittlerweile verstorben).

Die finanziellen Mittel konnte sich das Projekt vor allem aus der Schweiz beschaffen. Für Einzelmaßnahmen wurde ZISA auch durch die Ford Foundation, die Rockefeller Foundation und die Friedrich Ebert Stiftung finanziell unterstützt. Die Friedrich Naumann Stiftung war für ein Drittel der Finanzierung des Treffens in Dakar verantwortlich, sowie 1989 für ein IDASA-Seminar in Leverkusen.

ZISAs Aufgabe war die Organisation von Treffen in Harare zwischen weißen Südafrikanern und den Befreiungsbewegungen, sowie die Erstellung von Hintergrundinformation und Nachrichten aus und über Südafrika.

Dr. Orbons Aufgabe bestand in der Organisation der Zusammenkünfte. Er bearbeitete Bitten von Gesprächspartnern um Treffen, Seminare, Workshops und Konferenzen. Mit Hilfe seiner Sekretärin organisierte er Reisen, Unterkunft und Treffpunkte. ZISA arbeitete eng mit IDASA zusammen, doch auch andere Organisationen, wie die Universität Stellenbosch, traten an ZISA mit dem Anliegen heran, sich mit den Befreiungsbewegungen, vor allem mit dem ANC, zu treffen. Dr. Orbon hielt Kontakt mit allen Anti-Apartheidgruppen. Darüber hinaus war er in enger Verbindung mit den Vertretern der Befreiungsbewegungen in Harare.

Die Journalisten, die bei ZISA mitarbeiteten, hatten vor allem die Aufgabe, sich täglich mit südafrikanischen sowie ausländischen Medien zu befassen, um über die südafrikanischen Geschehnisse auf dem Laufenden zu sein. Das ermöglichte ihnen, Hintergrundmaterial und *Newsletter* für die Präsidenten der Frontstaaten und andere

wichtige Politiker, für Vertreter von Kirchen und für Gewerkschaftsführer u.a. in der Region zu erstellen. Die Informationen bildeten das Rohmaterial für ein Archiv, das mit Hilfe von zwei zimbabwischen Mitarbeitern aufgebaut wurde.

ZISA wurde also auf Bitten beider Konfliktparteien gegründet und unterscheidet sich deshalb von vielen anderen Organisationen, die von dritter Seite initiiert wurden. ZISA betrachtete sich als *facilitator*, der die Treffen ermöglichte und nicht als programmverantwortliche Organisation, die in die Programmgestaltung und die Gespräche eingriff.

Im Laufe der Jahre, zwischen 1987-1993, organisierte ZISA etwa 50 Treffen an denen insgesamt etwa 1000 Personen (nach Dr. Orbons Schätzung) teilnahmen.

Nach der Rede des Präsidenten De Klerk vom 2. Februar 1990, die den Bann der verbotenen Parteien aufhob und damit die Rückkehr der Exil Führer erlaubte, lief ZISA`s Mandat aus. Begegnungen konnten jetzt in Südafrika stattfinden. Es wurde bald klar, dass der Verhandlungsprozess zäh und lang sein würde, was leider die blutige Auseinandersetzung zwischen Inkatha und ANC bewies. Beide Parteien sahen ZISA als Organisation jedoch keineswegs als überflüssig an. ZISA wandte sich einer neuen Aufgabe zu und stellte damit ihre Flexibilität unter Beweis. Durch ein neues Programm erhielten junge Südafrikaner die Möglichkeit, in Zimbabwe, einem jungen unabhängigen afrikanischen Staat, kurzfristig Praktika durchzuführen, um in Bereichen, die bisher in Südafrika überwiegend weißen Arbeitskräften vorbehalten waren, Arbeitserfahrungen zu sammeln. Außerdem war klar, dass Information über die südafrikanischen Ereignisse innerhalb der Region auch weiterhin benötigt wurden. Mike Overmeyer wurde deshalb nach Kapstadt entsandt, von wo aus er regelmäßig *Factsheets* und Nachrichten nach Harare schickte.

ZISAs Ziele

ZISA sollte es den Parteien ermöglichen:

- die andere Seite persönlich kennen zu lernen
- deren Anliegen verstehen zu lernen
- festzustellen, in welchen Punkten Einigkeit bestand
- Vorbedingungen für offizielle Gespräche zu diskutieren
- die politische Richtung der Gegenseite kennenzulernen
- der Exilgruppe Kontakte zu einflussreichen Menschen in Südafrika zu ermöglichen

Diese Ziele wurden dadurch verfolgt, dass konkrete Begegnungen organisiert wurden, an denen Gespräche zwischen Personen mit ähnlichen Ausbildungen oder Interessen wie z.B. Wirtschaftsexperten, Juristen, Medien- sowie Kulturexperten oder auch Frauen stattfinden konnten.

So fand vom 31. Januar bis zum 4. Februar ein Treffen von Rechtsexperten statt, bei

dem verschiedene Aspekte einer Verfassung diskutiert wurden. Etwa 32 weiße Südafrikaner und 19 ANC Mitglieder nahmen an diesem Treffen teil. Ebenfalls durch ZISA organisiert wurde z.B. eine Frauenkonferenz mit 50 weißen Frauen und 50 Mitglieder der ANC Frauenliga unter Teilnahme von weiblichen Mitgliedern der Zimbabwe Regierungspartei Zanu-PF.

DER WELTFRIEDENSDIENST und das ZISA PROJEKT

Im Jahr 2009 entschied der Weltfriedensdienst (WFD) das ZISA Projekt unter folgenden Fragestellungen zu betrachten:

- Hat die Arbeit von ZISA einen Beitrag zum Transformationsprozess in Südafrika geleistet?
- Was hat diesen Beitrag ausgemacht?
- Können ZISAs Arbeitsweisen und Methoden in anderen Konflikten genutzt werden?

VORGANG DER WFD RECHERCHEN

Der WFD beantragte Mittel aus dem ZFD-Programm des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), um das ZISA Projekt zu analysieren. Diese Mittel wurden im Oktober 2009 bewilligt.

Die Projektlaufzeit war auf 4 Monate bis Ende März 2010 festgelegt. Eine Friedensfachkraft (FFK) mit Kurzzeitvertrag übernahm die Koordination des Vorhabens.

Am 14. Dezember 2009 traf sich eine Arbeitsgruppe, um den Untersuchungsrahmen zu vereinbaren. Eine Reise nach Südafrika wurde für Februar geplant, um etwa 10-12 Interviews mit Personen durchzuführen, die an dem ZISA Programm teilgenommen hatten. Mit der Durchführung der Interviews wurde Ruth Weiss beauftragt, die in dem ZISA Projekt mitgearbeitet hatte

Ab Januar 2010 begann der WFD Koordinator, Manfred Schumacher-Just, Termine für Interviews, zu vereinbaren. Namen und Adressen basierten auf Erinnerungswissen von Dr. H. Orbon und Ruth Weiss. Es war geplant, die ersten zwei Wochen im Februar in Johannesburg, die letzten zwei in Kapstadt zu verbringen. Von hier aus wurde ein Abstecher nach Durban vereinbart, um zwei Interviews zu führen. Der knappe Planungsvorlauf, der es erst ab den 14. Januar erlaubte, mit Terminplanungen zu beginnen, bedeutete, dass nicht alle erhofften Termine zur Zeit des Reiseantritts feststanden. Dies lag unter anderem auch daran, dass viele der Interviewpartner, wie z.B. Ex-Präsident Thabo Mbeki, stellvertretender Kabinetttminister Derek Hanekom oder Dr. Alex Boraine, Mitgründer von IDASA heute exponierte Stellungen haben.

Am 31. Januar 2010 flog der Koordinator zusammen mit Ruth Weiss nach Südafrika. Die Gestaltung des Programms wurde nicht nur durch die kurzfristige Planung

erschwert, sondern auch dadurch, dass die Durchführung mit den Feierlichkeiten zum 20. Jahrestag der De-Klerk-Rede sowie zum 20. Jahrestag der Freilassung Nelson Mandelas zusammen fiel, wodurch einige angefragte Personen nicht erreichbar waren. Der Koordinator versuchte während der gesamten Reise weitere Termine zu verabreden.

Folgende Interviews und Gespräche fanden statt (englische Fassungen vorhanden):

Gespräche in Johannesburg:

Hubertus von Welck, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, der Zugang zu dem Bericht über Dakar verschaffte;

Frene Ginwala, ANC Führerin, später erste Parlamentspräsidentin unter der demokratischen Verfassung, die an der Frauenkonferenz in Harare teilgenommen hatte, sich aber leider nicht an Details erinnerte. Sie hielt die Gespräche in Harare für wichtig, wie alle Zusammentreffen in dieser Zeit. Präsident Tambo hätte den Dialog bereits zu Beginn der 80er Jahre erwogen und danach verfolgt.

Barbara Masekela, ANC Führerin, die ebenfalls in Harare an der Frauenkonferenz teilgenommen hatte, konnte sich ebenfalls kaum an diese erinnern. Sie wusste jedoch gut über das Dakar-Treffen Bescheid, das für sie ein Durchbruch war. Sie hat dort Freundschaften geschlossen. Sie erinnerte sich, dass vom ANC-Headoffice oft mit Zeitdruck die kleine Gruppe hauptamtlicher MitarbeiterInnen gefragt wurde, an solchen Dialogveranstaltungen delegiert wurden. Sie fand, dass solche Treffen auch immer ein wertvolles Lernfeld für politisch sensible Zusammenkünfte war.

Dikgang Maseneke, PAC, heute Deputy Chief Justice des Constitutional Court (Oberrichter des Verfassungsgerichts), damals stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), der als Rechtsanwalt im Land tätig war. Er erinnerte sich gut an die Harare Treffen, denen er beigewohnt hatte, das erste Mal im Jahre 1987. Die Möglichkeit des Treffens außerhalb des Landes fand er wichtig. Er hat dort Bekanntschaften, z.B. mit Mike Spicer von Anglo American Corporation gemacht, die hilfreich waren. Freundschaften wollte er diese Bekanntschaften nicht nennen.

Helmut Orbon, damals ZISA Direktor, berichtete über die Gründung von ZISA, sowie dessen Ziele und Aufgaben. Er sah die Arbeit für sinnvoll und wichtig und erklärte, dass ZISA nicht als Schlichtungsinstanz agiert hatte, sondern eine Struktur bereitstellte, die Treffen zwischen Befreiungsbewegungen und weißen Südafrikanern ermöglichte. Jede Anfrage, Kontakt aufzunehmen wurde erst mit dem jeweiligen Vertreter der Organisation besprochen. Auch ohne ZISA wäre ein Dialog entstanden. Gespräche seien nützlich in einer Konfliktsituation, da die Kontrahenten von einer ‚Schwarz-Weiß-Situation‘ einsahen, dass es nicht nur um ‚gut und böse‘ ging, sondern dass Grauzonen bestanden. Das machte den Dialog schwieriger, aber eben möglich.

Stephan Ohme, damals BMZ-Referent an der Deutschen Botschaft in Harare und heute in gleicher Funktion in Pretoria, meinte, dass Bonn damals Dialogveranstaltungen mit Befreiungsbewegungen nicht in Betracht zog, da eine friedliche Lösung mit dem ANC nicht in das damalige politische Bild passte.

Einzelmaßnahmen wurden ggf. über die politischen Stiftungen finanziert. Man dachte vielmehr an eine Lösung mit dem Zuluführer Buthelezi als dem Mann der Zukunft.

Gespräche in Kapstadt und Stellenbosch

André Zaaiman, heute erfolgreicher Geschäftsmann, damals IDASA Beauftragter für Studentenprogramme. Zaaiman, afrikaanssprachiger Herkunft, kam als junger Mann nach seinem Militärdienst zur Erkenntnis, dass Apartheid moralisch nicht vertretbar war. Er gab sein Offiziersamt nach einer öffentlichen Erklärung ab und trat heimlich dem ANC bei. Bei IDASA war er für deren Studentenprogramm verantwortlich und arbeitete in Kreisen junger afrikaanssprachigen Studenten, organisierte deren Reisen in Nachbarländer, um sie aus der Isolation in die Südafrika geraten war, herauszuholen. Er arbeitete eng und gut mit ZISA zusammen und hielt es für wichtig, dass es diese Struktur gab und dazu im nahen Zimbabwe.

Mit folgenden Professoren der Universität Stellenbosch wurden Gespräche geführt:

Johann Groenewald, Soziologe, sprach über die Stellung, die die Stellenbosch Universität innerhalb der Afrikanergesellschaft einnahm. Er beschrieb, wie in den 80er Jahren die erste Opposition gegenüber der Nationalen Partei begann. Er war 1987, während der Dakar Gespräche, an der Yale Universität. Ab 1988 nahm er an diversen Treffen in Harare teil und fand diese wichtig. Mit seiner Frau Jeanette, die sich, wie Prof. Groenewald, gegen die Apartheidpolitik engagierte, konnten wir ebenfalls ein kurzes Gespräch führen. Sie arbeitete in den 80ziger Jahren an der „University of the Western Cape“ (für Farbige) und hatte erlebt, wie die Polizei die Studenten provozierte und behandelte. Sie leitete eine Gruppe Frauen, die sie in Stellenbosch für IDASA organisiert hatte und die an der ZISA Frauenkonferenz in Harare teilnahm.

Gerhard Erasmus, Jurist, der nach dem Dakartreffen, an dem er teilnahm, vorschlug, eine Verfassungskonferenz einzuberufen. Er reiste in diesem Zusammenhang mehrmals ins Ausland. Wie oben erwähnt, kam das Projekt im Januar 1989 zustande. Erasmus fand die Harare Treffen wichtig. Er verwies auf Professor Lubbe, der eine Akte über das Treffen im Januar 1989 besaß.

Bernhard Lategan, Theologe, erklärte, dass sein Kollege Johann (Jan) Kinghorn die ersten Kontakte mit Anti-Apartheidgegnern wie Dr. Beyers Naudé und Dr. van Zyl Slabbert geknüpft und die ersten Reisen nach Soweto geführt hätte. In Lategans theologischer Fakultät wurde damals an einem Forschungsprojekt gearbeitet, das sich mit der Frage eines neuen Wertesystems beschäftigte, das die Werte des Apartheidsystems ersetzen könnte.

Gerhard F. Lubbe, Jurist, heute Dean der Rechtsfakultät der Universität Stellenbosch, der sich vor allem an Thabo Mbeki erinnerte, der die Teilnehmer der Konferenz auf ihre Aufgabe, nämlich einer friedlichen Übergabe der Macht zu arbeiten, hinwies. Das wichtigste Thema der Konferenz war eine ‚Erklärung der Menschenrechte‘ (Bill of Rights), das vor allem die weißen Teilnehmer bewegte.

Prof. Lubbe meinte, es sei damals generell akzeptiert worden, dass Apartheid abgeschafft werden müsste. Er fand die Gespräche hilfreich.

Colin McCarthy, Ökonom, der sich nur vage an Treffen in Harare erinnerte, wohl aber an andere Gespräche in der Schweiz und England. Auch er fand den Dialog vor den offiziellen Verhandlungen wichtig.

Gespräche in Durban:

Phyllis Naidoo, führendes ANC Mitglied und Rechtsanwältin, jetzt 82 Jahre alt, erinnerte sich an keine Einzelheiten der ZISA-Veranstaltungen in Harare. Phyllis Naidoo hat ihre beiden Söhne während des Anti-Apartheidkampfes verloren. Sie erinnerte sich gut an das Dakartreffen, wo sie die Zusammenkunft mit Weißen als erfreulich empfand, sowie an ihre Freundschaft mit Dr. Orbon, der bestätigte, dass er die in Harare im Exil lebende Frau Naidoo als wichtige Bezugsperson für das ZISA-Programm gesehen hätte.

Mac Maharaj, exponierter ANC Führer, der in Dakar anwesend war. Er sah die Dialogserie lediglich als eine Bemühung der Leitung des ANC, den ANC zu „entmystifizieren“. Er meinte damit, das kolportierte Erscheinungsbild zu korrigieren, das der ANC im Exil keine von der Sowjetunion gesteuerte, bewaffnete Kämpfer waren, Maharaj war unmittelbar nach der Dakar-Konferenz in den Untergrund gegangen, um in Südafrika den Massenaufstand mitzuorganisieren und ein ANC Intelligenz-Netzwerk aufzubauen.

AUSWIRKUNGEN DES DIALOGPROGRAMMS

Die vereinbarten Veranstaltungen und die sich daraus entwickelten Kontakte zwischen weißen Afrikanern und Befreiungsbewegungen halfen, das Misstrauen und die Angst innerhalb der weißen Gesellschaft vor einer schwarzen Mehrheitsregierung zu vermindern. (Interviews Moseneke, Groenewald, Erasmus) Es wurden auch Freundschaften geschlossen. (Masekela, Lategan, Erasmus)

Die Veranstaltungen dienten der Vertrauensbildung. Sie lieferten den Beweis, dass sowohl schwarze und weiße engagierte Menschen die Apartheid überwinden wollten.

Für die afrikanische Seite bedeuteten das Zusammentreffen und die Diskussionen mit Weißen, die Erkenntnis zu gewinnen, wie sich eine Lösung für sie persönlich und für die schwarze Mehrheit darstellen könnte. Dadurch wurde die Sensitivität über das Thema Verhandlungen einerseits abgeschwächt, andererseits wurden auch Spannungen innerhalb der ANC Führerschaft darüber deutlich, wie nach der Demokratisierung mit dem Thema Verhandlungen und friedlicher Machtübernahme umzugehen sei.

Das Dialogprogramm war für den ANC auch ein diplomatisches Lernfeld, auf dem neue Fähigkeiten, wie z.B. Verhandlungsführung, praktisch erlebt werden konnten.

FRAGEN AN ZISA

Die Analyse des ZISA Dialogprojekts warf einige grundsätzliche Fragen auf:

1. Hat der fortwährende Dialog zur Konfliktlösung beigetragen und wenn ja, inwiefern?

Die Dialogteilnehmer sahen Dialog als Möglichkeit an, um mit einander bekannt zu werden, Vorurteile abzubauen (Stichwort: Entmystifizierung) und die Argumente der Gegenseite zu verstehen.

2. Unter welchen Umständen beeinflusst Dialog die Situation und welche Voraussetzungen sind für einen Dialog nötig? Ist nötig um Dialog zu ermöglichen?

Dialog ist dann möglich, wenn sich die Umstände für beide Seiten verändern. Im Fall Südafrika änderte sich die Situation einerseits durch die Beendigung des Kalten Krieges andererseits durch verstärkten Widerstand gegen die Apartheid für Befreiungsbewegungen sowie für das Regime.

3. Kann Dialog jederzeit oder nur unter besonderen Umständen beginnen? Muss der Konflikt einen bestimmten Punkt erreicht haben?

Die Broederbond-Dokumente der Jahre 1986 und 1989 belegen, dass die Politik des Präsidenten Botha versagt hatte, sodass Dialog die einzige Alternative zu weiterer Gewalt war. Die beteiligten Parteien wissen am besten selbst, ob ihre bisherige Strategie versagt hat und eine Kursänderung notwendig ist.

4. Hatten ZISA und Cold Comfort Farm als Symbole der Versöhnung einen Einfluss auf die Gespräche?

Mehrere Gesprächspartner fanden es wichtig, dass Treffen in Zimbabwe stattfanden, in einem von Schwarzen regierten, damals erfolgreichen Land mit Vorbildcharakter (Erasmus, Groenewald, Lategan, Zaaiman).

5. Haben die Gespräche den Transferprozess von Apartheid zur Demokratie beeinflusst?

Die meisten Gesprächspartner fanden, dass der Wechsel vorprogrammiert war.

6. Bereitete die Teilnahme an den Gesprächen Probleme für die Akteure?

Für den verhältnismäßig kleinen ANC Stab war es eine große Belastung, an allen der vielen Treffen teilzunehmen. Von weißer Seite wurden verschiedene persönliche Schwierigkeiten (Konflikt in der Familie, Sorge um Jobverlust bis hin zu Enterbungen, angeführt.) Für die Regierung in Pretoria war die Kontrolle der vielen Gespräche schwierig, da sie außerhalb des Landes stattfanden und von Mitgliedern der gesellschaftlichen Gruppen geführt wurden.

7. Was konnte man aus dem Dialogprogramm von ZISA lernen?

Maharaj fand, dass man lernte, dass die Protagonisten des Konflikts selbst den

Friedensprozess in die Hand nehmen mussten.

Andere waren der Meinung, dass der Dialogprozess einen wichtigen Baustein zum Erfolg der späteren Verhandlungen beigetragen hat.

8. Hat es sich gelohnt den Weg eines Dialogprozesses zu gehen?

Die übereinstimmende Meinung bei allen Interviewten war, dass es sich sehr gelohnt hat.

Professor Lategan sagte:

„Der wichtige Beitrag von ZISA auf Cold Comfort in Harare war es, den feindlichen Seiten ein Forum zu geben, wo die Stereotypen auf beiden Seiten überprüft werden konnten, sodass es möglich war, wenigstens anzufangen, anders über die anderen zu denken. Ich denke, dass war der wichtigste Beitrag. Sie hatten keine Macht, sie hatten keine festgelegte Position, aber sie ermöglichten diese Treffen. Und auf längere Zeit, denke ich, war es absolut notwendig, dass Südafrikaner sich kennen lernten wegen der langen Isolation. Cold Comfort hat keine Partei ergriffen, aber sie ermöglichten den beiden Seiten, sich in einer Weise zu begegnen, die man nie für möglich gehalten hatte. Man war nicht im Sinn eines Angeklagten, der mit Anschuldigungen bombardiert wurde. Es war ein ehrlicher Versuch, einen Dialog zu beginnen.“

Oder, wie André Zaiiman sagte: „Das wertvolle an ZISA war, dass es dies gab.“

KANN ZISA ALS MODELL FÜR ANDERE KONFLIKTE ANGESEHEN WERDEN?

Es wäre gewagt, zu behaupten, dass ZISA einzigartig war – weil, wie Dr. Orbon in einem Bericht schrieb – es ein richtiges Projekt zur richtigen Zeit am richtigen Platz war. Aber es war ebenfalls keineswegs klar, ob ZISA in anderen Konfliktsituationen möglich ist.

Fest steht, dass ZISA eins von mehreren Dialogprojekten zur damaligen Zeit war, die insgesamt den Verlauf der Verhandlungen ab 1990 zwischen der Regierung und den Anti-Apartheidorganisationen, vor allem mit dem ANC, erleichterte. Vertrauen war geschaffen, man kannte sich, der Umgang war entspannt.

Als wichtig ist herauszustellen, dass der Beitrag von ZISA sich von anderen Dialogprojekten unterschied und dadurch seinen besonderen Wert erhielt. Beide Parteien des Konflikts betrieben die Gründung von ZISA; damit lag das Ownership in den Händen der Akteure.

ZISA war kein ‚Friedensstifter‘ oder eine Schlichtungsinstanz, sondern lediglich „facilitator“, der nichts mit der Agenda oder Gesprächsinhalten zu tun hatte.

Der Dialog begann zu einem frühen Zeitpunkt und konnte sich entwickeln.

Der Dialogprozess wurde von den Akteuren bestimmt und gesteuert

ZISA ermöglichte den ANC-Vertretern im Exil eine Auseinandersetzung mit

Sichtweisen der Konfliktpartei. Auch bei den späteren Verhandlungen gab es bei der Lösung des südafrikanischen Konflikts keine Friedensstifter von außen, sondern, wie Mac Maharaj es beschrieb, den Parteien „gehörte der Friedensprozess.“

FROM TALKS-ABOUT-TALKS
TO NEGOTIATIONS

ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION OF
ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
(ZISA) TO DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN REGIME AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
1987-1993

RUTH WEISS

March 2010

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FROM TALKS-ABOUT-TALKS TO NEGOTIATIONS

ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION OF ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (ZISA) TO DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME AND LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 1987-1993

*It was accepted that...further contacts were necessary
Dakar Declaration, July 1987*

I. BACKGROUND

Causes of Conflict

South Africa celebrates its 100th birthday this year, having come into existence as a British Dominion, the Union of South Africa, on May 31st, 1910, eight years after the end of the Anglo-Boer war. The political bickering accompanying its birthpangs ensured instability from the start, as each of the four unified states – two British colonies, two Boer republics – were allowed to keep their own franchise system. This meant only the Cape had voting rights for all races based on property and other qualifications, with this concession watered down and eventually abolished in the decades that followed. South Africa's population comprised whites, Africans (blacks), Asians and people of mixed race (Coloureds).

In the run-up to the new dispensation, a racially mixed group led by the Cape Prime Minister William Schreiner travelled to London in 1909 to protest unsuccessfully against the lack of racial equality. The delegation's failure meant that political protest was built into the constitution, spilling in time into open conflict. Only the last sixteen years of the century-old state enjoyed a democratic system, with May 1994 witnessing the sight of South Africans of all races joyfully queuing for miles in the hot sun in front of ballot boxes.

This second birth did not come easily, succeeding as it did decades of unrest and strife, with generations of non-whites deprived of their birthrights and a major toll of dead and injured. Only in the '80s did the façade of white power crack, leading in 1990 to conceding the inevitability of dismantling the segregation system known as apartheid, prior to four years of negotiations and transition before transfer of power from the minority to the majority.

Fearing for their rights, leading Africans had founded the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912, two years after Union to protect black interests. A year later their worst fears were confirmed, when the Land Act of 1913, the first segregation law, deprived Africans of the right to own or rent land, apart from that communally owned in so-called reserves, which covered only some 7 ½ per cent of the total area: a recipe for disaster and conflict. Protest against the discrimination of non-whites continued, inevitably with mounting intensity.

The road towards the goal of democratic majority rule was long and hard. Racism and suppression of the black majority, always an inherent part of South African society, culminated in 1948 in the electoral triumph of the National Party (NP), the party of Afrikaners, the descendants of the Boer settlers, with their 'apartheid' ideology. Racial separation had always been the custom in South Africa, but after 1948 apartheid was institutionalised by means of specific legislation. This was intended to control of the lives of black South Africans, dictating their place of domicile, work and movements, with inclusion of a programme of so-called "separate, parallel development", whereby physical "homelands" were created, to one of which each black South African was deemed to belong. The aim was to deprive Africans of South African citizenship. All opposition to the apartheid doctrine was brushed aside and brutally suppressed

On March 30th, 1960, the day on which the South African government banned the ANC and its 1959-formed splinter party Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a defining moment occurred in the country's violent history outside Cape Town's Parliament. A young PAC leader, student Philip Kgosana had led a silent crowd of 30 000 from Langa township to face mounted police in Caledon Square. Kgosana wanted to see Justice Minister Erasmus on the burning issue of the pass laws, over which 69 people had died a week earlier at Sharpeville, near Vereeniging. The police persuaded Kgosana with the other leaders to return to Langa to wait for a response later that day. This came at 18.00 and was devastating: Saracens - armed vehicles - descended on the waiting crowd in the Cape Flats, killing around twenty and injuring many more. Kgosana and other PAC leaders were arrested.

It signalled the apartheid regime's contemptuous ill-will towards its black citizens and its refusal to accept peaceful overtures. In the wake of Sharpeville and Langa, the parties turned to force to gain the rights of the black majority. On December 16th, 1961, the ANC announced the existence of a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), while Poqo, a splinter PAC group, embarked on a terror campaign. Later PAC formed its Armed Peoples Liberation Army (APLA).

External ANC

The ANC had already decided in 1959 to establish an international presence by sending its then Vice-President Oliver Tambo abroad, Nelson Mandela's friend and former partner in their law practice. The decision was hurriedly executed, after the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre, beating the banning of the ANC and the PAC by a matter of days. The internal structures of the parties were largely destroyed during this decade. It was into this vacuum that the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) erupted in 1968.

In time, the ANC became the main international focus of resistance to the apartheid regime, with ANC President Tambo a widely respected figure. Influenced as the ANC was by Mahatma Gandhi, who had spent 20 years in South Africa, where he evolved his doctrine of Satyagraha – non-violent resistance - it had taken the step towards armed struggle only reluctantly. It opted for the use of sabotage not terror, so as to cause no loss of life. Armed struggle – "armed propaganda" as it was eventually named - never became an end in itself, but was always subject to political decision. The ultimate goal of the liberation movements was that of a negotiated transfer of power. Thus Oliver Tambo stressed in 1987 at an

international conference in Arusha that the organisation was not opposed to negotiation “for the sake of it”. The ANC would not choose war if “any alternative, non-violent path were available to it.” (1)

The ANC relied on four strategies to gain its end, according to the veteran ANC leader Mac Maharaj: political underground structures, mass mobilisation, international diplomacy and armed struggle, with the latter the most controversial. (2) From the mid-80s the issue of achieving the end through peaceful means, by opening dialogue to lead to a negotiated settlement, moved closer to central stage of ANC leadership consideration.

Armed struggle

Nonetheless, the armed struggle continued, though not without debate. Following the founding of MK, the debate never died down within the ANC, whether or not to escalate the use of force. Discussion on this point flared up again in the late 60s, when the then Africa-based leadership won the day against the London-based section. MK thereupon joined the failed 1967/8 infiltration of the Zambezi Valley by the anti-white-Rhodesian liberation movement, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), which ended in the defeat at Wankie. This led to criticism and restructuring of MK. Following the 1976 Soweto uprising and the exodus of thousands of youths, renewed efforts were made to rebuild internal structures

The flow of new MK recruits revived the debate concerning armed struggle, reaching a climax at the 1985 Kabwe’s Consultative Conference, when a decision was taken against attacks on “soft” - non-military - targets. During the 80s, infiltration into South Africa by freedom fighters increased. Some spectacular successes were achieved, such as the attack in June 1980 by the MK Solomon Mahlangu Detachment on the oil-from-coal installation SASOL, resulting in some R66m damage.

At the same time the mood in the black townships was rebellious, with unrest endemic since the 1976 uprising of the youth. In view of the developing situation, Oliver Tambo decided in the early 80s to establish an internal intelligence network and an ANC internal leadership through an operation named Vula, clandestinely despatching such top ANC personalities as Mac Maharaj and Ronald Kasrils into the country.

While Pretoria’s forces were kept on permanent alert and the country suffered from increasing threats to stability, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was not seriously challenged inside South Africa that is by the ANC. In his book *The Other Side of History*, Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert quoted a SADF document which stated that during the 80s, only 4 per cent of military contact involved MK: the military action was elsewhere.

Frontline States (FS)

Following its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's President joined the informal Frontline States (FS) group of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, which had emerged in 1976 to cope with the ongoing Southern Rhodesian conflict. The FS established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to push regional development and lessen dependence on South Africa. This defeated Pretoria's attempt to control the region through its Constellation of Southern African States to be composed of South Africa, its so-called four independent Homelands and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

The FS success, the subsequent Pretoria's failure of controlling the region as well as increased ANC insurgency, shifted the power from the political, police-centred elite of the 60s and 70s to the military and the National Intelligence Service (NIS), transforming the regime virtually into a civil-military junta. This embarked on a policy of "total strategy", i.e. destabilisation of its hinterland as the ANC's hosts, through economic sabotage, military strikes, use of proxy groups such as Unita in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, Lesotho Liberation Army, dissident groups in Zimbabwe.

In the 70s, Pretoria had made incursion into Angola to stop the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho (MPLA) from taking over the government. MPLA sought help from the Soviet Union and received this in the shape of Cuban military and civil personnel. The SADF subsequently was militarily engaged both in Angola, which became independent in 1975 and neighbouring Namibia, which Pretoria occupied illegally. Cadres of the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO infiltrated into northern Namibia from Angola.

Pretoria's bad faith was illustrated by its continuing to assist Renamo after it had signed a peace accord with Mozambique's Frelimo government at Nkomati in 1984.

Internal Mass Unrest

Early 1980 Pretoria attempted unsuccessfully to 'reform' its parliamentary system by creating a tricameral system which included whites, Asians and Coloureds. Thanks to this move, new mass movement structures emerged internally, foremost the United Democratic Front (UDF) which fronted a wide range of anti-apartheid groups including trade union, Churches and others. President P.W. Botha's constitutional reforms crashed, failing as it did to address African rights. In January 1985 President Botha called on South Africans "to make South Africa ungovernable", which increased the fermenting unrest in black townships, which also had the unfortunate effect of mob action against suspected 'collaborators'.

Pretoria's response was harsh, with the declaration of a State of Emergency and brutal repression, resulting in the deaths of some 5 000 and detention of around 50 000 during the 80s. Calls for 'mass insurrection' became audible.

The scene seemed to be set for a race war.

II. MOVING TOWARDS DIALOGUE

Yet none other than Nelson Mandela, incarcerated as he was, took up the pen in the mid-80s to contact South Africa's President Pieter Willem Botha – P.W. as he was known – feeling that the time was right for dialogue. Similar thoughts were expressed by some elements within the external ANC such as Thabo Mbeki, while it was still abhorrent to others.

By the mid-80s Pretoria was under pressure, as Botha's presidency reached a dead-end and internal dissent and external pressure mounted. International disapproval of apartheid, expressed through sanctions and a boycott by major banks, badly affected the country's economy and currency. Moreover the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the international scene changed the balance of power, heralding the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Moscow backed efforts to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to stop the war in Angola, efforts which succeeded and signalled the end of the Cold War. South Africa became irrelevant for western powers, while the ANC's major backer began to withdraw its support.

In 1982, Nelson Mandela and four of his closest comrades had been taken from the other political prisoners from Robben Island to Pollsmoor prison, before Mandela was isolated from his comrades in 1985 and in 1988 removed to a cottage on the grounds of Victor Verster prison, where he was groomed for release in 1990.

In November 1985 the then Minister of Justice and Prisons, Kobie Coetsee, visited his famous prisoner in a Cape Town hospital - the beginning of Coetsee's, that is, the establishment's *toenadering* – getting close – to Mandela. No doubt Coetsee tried to separate Mandela from his comrades and co-opt him for his own purposes, an attempt Mandela resisted successfully. He pointed out that he would not negotiate with the government, urging Pretoria to do so with the ANC. Mandela publicly refused Botha's 1985 offer to release him in exchange for rejecting violence, stating that he would never give up the armed struggle for personal gain.

Subsequently the head of the NIS, Dr. Niel Barnard, who had already dared in 1983 to speak to President Botha of the need to talk to the ANC, became deeply involved with other NIS officials in secret government-Mandela meetings. Botha, irascible and dogmatic, was implacably opposed to talks with the ANC, unless they gave up armed struggle. Nonetheless, in the years of the run-up to Mandela's release, Barnard and his deputy Mike Louw had close to 50 meetings with the future president. He was one of the men present when Mandela was invited by President Botha for tea on July 5, 1989 – truly a mere social invitation, though the former had written the famous Mandela Document for the historic meeting, spelling out the need and conditions for talks between Pretoria and the ANC.

Efforts to achieve this were by then well on the way.

Dialogue phase

Following Coetsee's hospital visit, which had marked a new phase in the government – ANC conflict, both sides delicately stretched out feelers to test the possibility of direct contacts, the first moves away from repression and confrontation. As a result, parallel processes took place:

Continued contact between Pretoria and Mandela
Contact between Pretoria and Lusaka (the headoffice of the ANC);
other initiatives to enable meetings between prominent members of the white community and the liberation movements.

For both the ANC leaders and for Pretoria, as well as for South African civil society, it was a sensitive process to establish contact with the other side. While President Tambo was anxious to effect peace without bloodshed, he was aware that the external leadership might open itself to accusations of 'selling-out', so that any moves, even if taken after lengthy deliberations, were shrouded in secrecy. The government side too had to keep a wary eye on its constituencies, particularly its relentless right wing. Individuals who involved themselves in the process ran the risk of vilification.

Thus Denis Goldberg, the veteran ANC leader and Rivonia trialist in February 2010 recalled an internal ANC meeting of the 80s, at which Thabo Mbeki was attacked for his view that neither military action nor sanctions – the latter being constantly circumvented - would not bring down the NP government and that a less confrontational approach had to be considered. (3) ANC comrades ran the risk of being labelled sell-outs.

Prominent white participants at the talks who have recorded their experiences, also mention their doubts, fears and trepidations: fear of the wrath of Pretoria and of ostracism within their community.

Nonetheless, South Africa's civil society sought with increasing interest contact with "terrorists", realising that the situation had become untenable. Change was on the way. Churchill's words that "jaw-jaw was better than war-war", took on a South African flavour, as slowly the ANC began to consider negotiations versus mass mobilisation as a possible, if not yet the preferred option, while NP support within white society, even within Afrikanerdom, began to crack.

A process began of informal dialogue between prominent white South Africans and members of the liberation movements, which served to break down preconceived ideas and prejudice, with common ground explored and established between the parties. Within both the ANC – government contacts and ANC-individual talks, pre-conditions for a settlement as well as contentious issues concerning the economy and a new constitution could be spelt out and concepts for possible policies at the end of conflict formulated.

New dialogue skills were honed and also a new South African camaraderie developed between participants at talks. Stories were later told of mutually friendly, not to say boisterous evenings, of African delegates happily using Afrikaans, both at ANC – government as well as the ANC – civil society get-

together. Thus Justice Dikgang Moseneke said that it was during informal sessions such as sharing a meal that one got to know each other. (4) It was natural that in the course of friendly exchanges, participants at such meetings began to change their perceptions and stereotype views of their opponents. On their part, Africans sensed that a solution was within grasp and began to appreciate that this would bring its own rewards.

The greater ease between protagonists was conveyed to Pretoria, which helped to give officials the sense that negotiations were not only possible but could actually succeed. Pressure to move towards negotiation hardened as informal contacts increased.

Heralding Change

The year 1989 was the year of transition. Early that year the possibility of change seemed finally in the offing. In January a stroke disabled President Botha, thus offering an unexpected window of opportunity.

A new man, Frederik Willem De Klerk first took over as party leader in February, then in August as President. Under pressure by London and Washington – with unrest continuing unabated - he began to take steps towards easing the tense situation. He began by emasculating the military. In September he permitted the protest march led by Archbishop Tutu, in October the remaining Rivonia trial prisoners except Mandela were released (Govan Mbeki had previously been released on health grounds).

This ushered in a new era.

In December, 1989 the ANC issued its Harare Declaration which spelt out the conditions under which talks with Pretoria to achieve a negotiated settlement could be considered. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) accepted the Declaration, the final action of Oliver Tambo who suffered a stroke soon afterwards. It was left to his aide and confidante Thabo Mbeki to present the statement to the UN for approval.

The follow-up was dramatic. On February 2, 1990, De Klerk rose in Parliament to make his most famous speech, announcing the unbanning of the black political parties and the Communist Party, also of other illegal organizations and announcing the end of apartheid. In the House, in South Africa and abroad his words were heard in stunned amazement. After 42 years, one of the most unjust system of government in the post-World War II was ending.

A new situation needed a new approach. The ANC was by no means united in its reaction, with some leaders arguing that there was now no other way but to talk, while others felt De Klerk had shown that the enemy was weak and that victory lay in attack on the march to Pretoria.

The next step took place on February 9, for South Africa an unforgettable day: Nelson Mandela walked hand in hand with his wife Winnie out of Victor Verster Prison to freedom and jubilantly enthusiastic crowds. Mandela's conciliatory stance and preparedness to shake hands with his erstwhile jailers,

his gentleness and also his unwavering faith in his cause and his party, have made history. Once Mandela was free, the exiles able to return and political prisoners freed, direct official contact – more talks about talks - between the ANC and Pretoria could begin.

However, there was no instant getting-together after Mandela's walk to freedom. Both parties had to ensure their mandate from their constituencies. Thus the official contact wavered at first, with both sides jostling for the best possible starting position. The ANC needed to prove that it entered talks on its own terms and wished to establish MK as a successful military organisation. The NP was anxious to show that its decision to negotiate had not been forced by military action, but was the result of political deliberation.

The armed struggle continued to be a stumbling block to negotiations. Eventually the ANC leadership decided in December 1990, without consultation of MK cadres, to suspend the armed struggle, which did not meet the approval of all comrades. Indeed in the course of subsequent negotiations Mandela once threatened to return to armed struggle, incensed when he was that animosity and bloody conflict between the ANC and the Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which had broken out after 1990, was stirred up by white security elements and which claimed more deaths, some 10 000 between 1990 and 1994, than during any other time.

Still, everyone, i.e. the government and the anti-apartheid parties, realised that a multi-party conference had to be called, in order to begin structured negotiations. After September 1991 when a Peace Accord was signed between every party and organisation concerned, including the security forces, this became a reality, with 20 parties participating at a Preparatory Meeting. This led to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa 1 and 2), charged with the job of drawing up terms for establishing a constitution-making body, ahead of free and fair elections. This had not happened easily, with De Klerk trying to impose a white veto by means of a power-sharing constitution with mechanisms to protect white privileges, while the ANC wanted a brief transition followed by elections under a democratic dispensation. An interim constitution was adopted in 1993 was replaced by the current constitution which came into effect in February 1997.

It was only after the protracted Codesa negotiations that MK was officially disbanded in 1994 and integrated into the SADF. By then the interim constitution and the successful election of May 1994 had established the ANC as the main governing party, with Mandela in the post of President.

III. PLAYERS IN PRE-NEGOTIATION TALKS

The 80s had been a difficult phase for both parties to the conflict, which increased in intensity and violence. Yet the need to end the violence and replace killing with talking, was ever present. As mentioned, various players became active during this decade, foreign governments as well as individuals and civil society organisations, in efforts to negotiate between the parties. The same aim was pursued by all these actors, namely initiating and intensifying contact between the opposing sides with a view to formal negotiations.

Meetings between prominent white South Africans and liberation movements were organized at a person-to-person level, apart from secret links forged from 1985 onwards between government officials and freedom movements in exile or the talks between government officials and Nelson Mandela.

Foreign government initiatives included the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG), who visited Mandela in prison in 1986 and proposed conditions to lead to a settlement. However, during their stay in South Africa, Pretoria launched an across-border military strike. This caused the EPG to abandon their effort, pointing out that the time for talking was not yet right for the ANC (5) and the leadership was relieved that the government's military action saved them from the embarrassment of rejecting the proposed EPG terms, which the group had brought to Oliver Tambo in Lusaka.

The latter and his crown prince Thabo Mbeki had their own agenda: the ANC leaders were appalled by the way peace was imposed by the British on Zimbabwe and the UN on Namibia. They wanted themselves to determine the path to dialogue and beyond. As the violence and brutality of the conflict increased, the ANC Lusaka headquarters became the Mecca of anxious mediators, of whom Prof. Hendrik W. van der Merwe who died in 2001, was one of the first, another a Cape Town human rights lawyer, Richard Rosenthal. Other interested parties such as the UK's Chatham Houses were among those sponsoring meetings during 1989.

Thabo Mbeki, who was to become South Africa's second black President under the new dispensation, was then in charge of the ANC's Department of Information and Publicity (DIP). He became an advocate for replacing killing with talking. In 1985 he helped to organise the first meeting with important white visitors to Zambia, a group of businessmen led by Anglo American's Gavin Relly. The group had talks at Mafuwe with a strong ANC contingent.

This paved the way for others, including a contingent of politicians, mainly Progressive Federal Party (PFP) visitors in October 1987 led by the former PFP leader, Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert. A group of Stellenbosch students also travelled to Lusaka despite open government disapproval. A group of academics from the same university visited Lusaka in 1988 for the first time.

Thabo Mbeki became the known face of various talks between the ANC and civil society. He was in great demand during those years, jetting from one set of near-clandestine meeting to another, to Harare, Geneva, Constance, Leverkusen, Berlin, Paris, London and even to New York in 1986, when he met Piet de Lange, the head of the *Afrikaner Broederbond (AB)*, the secret Afrikaner society which had pulled the political strings since the NP 1948 election victory.

Mbeki, son of Govan Mbeki, the second most senior ANC leaders, had been educated outside South Africa and was one of the best known international ANC figures. Educated in South Africa, the UK and Moscow, he had received military training in the Soviet Union, had worked in the 70s first in Botswana and Zambia, before becoming Chief ANC representative in Swaziland and Nigeria. Close to Oliver Tambo, he was responsible in the 80s for several specialist areas such as the committees on cultural boycott and disinvestment, apart from DIP. Observers of

the South African exile scene saw him at the time as a good speaker and outstanding intellectual, charming and diplomatic, who figured prominently in the all contacts with white South Africans. As South Africa's president later (1999-2008), he attracted a good deal of criticism for his policies on Aids and Zimbabwe.

One series of talks-about-talks between government or individuals close to government and the ANC, was the subject of the British film "Endgame", which featured twelve meetings over three years held secretly at a venue in Britain. The Mells talks were indeed driven by the Pretoria regime, as a way to test the waters and also to clarify thorny issues, thus helping to pave the way towards President De Klerk's moves in 1989/90.

Criticism of the film was made by ANC insiders such as Frene Ginwala, who felt that too much credit was claimed for the Mells talks, pointing out important omissions and errors in reporting: an inevitable result of a film, which by its nature highlights dramatic events. The main, but not the only participants in Britain were Mbeki and philosophy Professor Willie Esterhuysen, a prominent Afrikaner intellectual, whose efforts had the blessing of Pretoria and the head of its secret service. The meetings had been organised by Michael Young, head of the publicity department of Consolidated Gold Fields (CGF), ironically the company founded by arch imperialist Cecil Rhodes. CGF head, Randolph Agnew, agreed to finance the meetings which took place in Mells Park, the company's country Somerset retreat. The elegant setting of a former gentleman's country seat, where Mbeki and Esterhuysen sat over a bottle of malt whisky, was far removed from the blood, sweat and tears of South Africa's township. Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, poured scorn over the claim that these talks were as important as claimed by Mbeki supporters. (6)

Be that as it may, Professor Esterhuysen was honoured by the democratic South African government for "*his outstanding role in opening and maintaining dialogue between the ANC and the apartheid government, which contributed both to the removal of obstacles to negotiations to end apartheid and create a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa,*" according to the citation.

During 1989 as the pace of contact accelerated, with many meetings in different countries and often between different participants on both sides, it was difficult to assess which were the most important. However, one series of meetings which took place over three years, was not publicised, neither at the time, when this was policy, nor subsequently, when journalists, academics and participants began to talk of their experiences.

The venue was Harare, Zimbabwe and these talks flowed out of an earlier meeting between the ANC and a group led by Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert in Senegal in July 1987. This gathering at Dakar was bathed in the glare of publicity inside South Africa (the outside world took little note of it) and was subsequently mentioned in different memoirs and books. However, little became known of the Harare meetings which followed Dakar, neither at the time nor subsequently. This report is an attempt to fill in this gap.

It must not be thought that the ANC entered dialogue without preparation. As the former GDR Ambassador Hans-Georg Schleicher outlined (7), analytical and

conceptual papers were prepared in exile (London, Lusaka, Maputo), thanks to the intellectual resources available. The 1955 Freedom Charter principles remained the basic guidelines, but these were amended and/or modified in time.

It is impossible to date or list all the meetings between 1985 and 1990. The following are those that participants considered the most significant:

Meetings between white South Africans and the ANC, 1985-1990

- 1985** July The ANC leadership met a businessmen group led by Gavin Relly of Anglo American Corporation at Mafuwe, Zambia
- Oct. Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert led a group of politicians and others to Zambia; 1986 Institute for Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) was formed
- 1986** Thabo Mbeki met Professor Pieter de Lange, head of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond in New York
- 1987** July An ANC delegation of 17 met a 61-head IDASA delegation in **Dakar**, Senegal; Oct. Zimbabwe Institute on Southern Africa (ZISA) established in Harare
- Oct. **ZISA began its operation of facilitating meetings in Harare between Liberation Movements and white South Africans**
- 1988** Mells Park talks begin between ANC and Prof. W.Esterhuysen
- 1989** Jan Constitutional Seminar in Harare attended by 32 white academics and 19 ANC members facilitated by ZISA
- Sept. Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma met 2 National Intelligence Service agents in Switzerland
- Oct. IDASA meeting with the ANC at Leverkusen, Germany: Soviet Experts were present at this gathering
- Nov. IDASA meeting with the ANC in Paris

IV. INSTITUTE FOR A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA (IDASA)

The Harare meetings which took place during the turbulent years between 1987 and 1990 were the result of an initiative by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), the think tank founded by Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and the Rev. Dr. Alex Boraine in 1987. As mentioned, Dr. Slabbert had visited Lusaka in October 1987, that is, shortly after the Gavin Relly trip and had got on well with both Tambo and Mbeki. Tambo's close associate Frene Ginwala said that Tambo told Slabbert to "talk to Afrikaners" (8). This may be so. In 1986 both Slabbert and Boraine had resigned from parliament and the PFP, with Slabbert stating that he considered parliament to have become irrelevant. IDASA was the result.

The honorary president of IDASA was the remarkable Afrikaner theologian, Dr. Christiaan Beyers Naudé, a member of a staunch Calvinist family, whose father was a leading member of the secret Broederbond and who had been Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church. Dr. Naudé had come to the conclusion that apartheid was an unjust system not compatible with Christian principles. In the 60s he had founded the Christian Institute and had also breached the rules of the Broederbond

by making it public, which had made him a pariah within his own society and led to long years of banning and house arrest. He became an inspiration for many young people, especially Afrikaners who by the 80s had begun to reject apartheid. Naude was one of the delegates at Dakar.

IDASA continued to function post-1994 and is still an active NGO, with offices in Pretoria and Cape Town.

Dakar meeting

Dr. van Zyl Slabbert, determined to engage the ANC, was a lone voice in the wilderness in the 80s, derided by many and loathed by the Afrikaner right.

Slabbert raised funds (partly from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation partly from George Soros, was also assisted by Danielle Mitterand, wife of the then French President) to organise a meeting from July 9-12, 1987 in Senegal, between an IDASA delegation of 61 white - mainly Afrikaner - South Africans and a smaller ANC delegation of seventeen, led by Thabo Mbeki. It was to prove a landmark in white-ANC relations.

The white side was a mix of academics, journalists, professional and businessmen such as Hermann Giliomee, professor of political science at the University of Cape Town (UCT), the editor of *Vrye Weekblad*, the theologian Braam Viljoen, brother of General Constand Viljoen (who came out of retirement from the military to enter politics after 1990), the writers Andre Brink and Breyten Breytenbach, Gerhard Erasmus, Professor of Law at Stellenbosch University, also Dr. Beyers Naudé. The ANC side included several of its most important leaders apart from Thabo Mbeki such as Chris Hani, Pallo Jordan, Mac Maharaj, Barbara Masekela, Alfred Nzo, Steve Thwete, Kader Asmal. (9)

Basically Dakar was concerned with four areas:

- Strategies for effecting fundamental change in South Africa;
- The building of national unity;
- Perspectives of government structures of a free South Africa;
- The economy of a liberated South Africa.

Written papers were presented by four IDASA delegates, while four ANC members made verbal presentations, which were unrecorded. The whites listened closely as the ANC leaders expounded their goals and strategies. In particular they were concerned with the armed struggle and the proliferation of violence. (10) It was important to note that delegates agreed that the armed struggle had brought them together, as one outsider present, Dr. Klaus Frhr. von der Ropp, noted in his report for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation

However, all aims were overshadowed by the psychological impact. Not only was the mood cordial, as Slabbert described, but for both sides the personal contact was overwhelming. Whites entered the meeting with fear and suspicion and mistrust were not instantly dispersed. Certainly these were softened, as personal contact replaced preconceived ideas and stereotyped images of bloodthirsty blacks on the one hand and brutal Boers on the other. Barbara Masekela felt she had made new

friends (11) and she was not alone in this feeling. Mbeki said that having spent time together, "I think an understanding had developed. It has been a very important experience for all of us. None of us has had an experience like this before". (12) Von der Ropp, who reported more on the contents of the presentations, remarked that at the official opening of the gathering, the delegations were strictly segregated, but at the final session, they were mixed.

Apart from the talks in Dakar, the ANC leaders and the whites took two field trips, one to Ghana, where ANC speakers defended the right of whites as South Africans, which reinforced a sense among whites that the ANC was truly prepared to accept an inclusive democracy. The delegates agreed to continue with such meetings and issued the Dakar Declaration to this effect.

For both sides Dakar proved a breakthrough. Having arrived full of trepidation, the whites had been overwhelmed by the readiness of most ANC leaders to accept them. They were impressed by Mbeki's urbane manner, friendly overtures and in general by the level of discussion. Though the group was subjected to criticism, hostility and abuse on their return, the publicity surrounding the Dakar meeting made an enormous impact within South Africa and had an effect on the general public. The delegates themselves were never the same again, as one comment had it. (13)

Participants on both sides were aware of the interest of the South African security services in the meeting and that either someone was reporting directly to Pretoria's National Intelligence Service or the NIS would obtain information indirectly. (In his interview in February 2010, Mac Maharaj said he attended the meeting deliberately, to make the secret service think he was ill and disabled, as he was then about to embark on the dangerous Operation Vula).

The white group experienced abuse and rejection on their return home. Individuals felt the impact, as Slabbert mentioned in his *The Other Side of History*: Theuns Eloff resigned from a conservative Dutch Reformed Church as a clergyman and headed the Consultative Business Movement; Trudie de Ridder was disowned by her family and fired from her government job; Grethe Fox, who promoted non-racial art, was ostracised by the establishment.

As the Dakar days changed perceptions, both sides accepted that talks were important and were determined to continue such contact.

Afrikaners

It was thus Afrikaners, the descendants of Boers (immigrants in earlier centuries mainly from Holland, also Germany and France), who in 1987 were the first group from South Africa's civil society to hold informal talks with the "enemy", before Pretoria approved such contacts or considered talking officially to the ANC. True, the under-wraps talks with Mandela were being conducted during these years, but this did not impact on P.W.Botha's policy towards the ANC nor was it known within the country. Everyone meeting the ANC was threatened with the loss of passport or worse.

The English-speaking group, their focus more on economic than political control, was not as deeply involved in the various initiatives. Understandable, for apartheid was the Afrikaner ideology, the Afrikaner party formed the government, so that only Afrikaners could end what they had begun.

Apartheid was not conceived as an evil doctrine, even if it was to lead to unjust government, brutal oppression and increasing human rights violation. Afrikaners were fundamental Calvinists, who had come to believe that God had placed them at the end of a continent for a purpose: they were to guard his backward children, the dark-skinned people. Slavery had reinforced their conviction of the black inferiority.

Boers had resented the arrival of the British with their newfangled liberal ideas and at the end of slaveholding; they trekked with their servants, families, guns and the Bible out of the Cape Colony. Ahead lay unknown territory with hostile people, behind the hated British. Boers furnished the first Prime Ministers of the Union of South Africa, while the English-speaking compatriots turned their attention to the economy. And it was the Boers who first realised the threat to white power posed by the ascendancy of the despised blacks. Apartheid was designed to ensure the survival of Afrikaners as a white-skinned people within a sea of blacks, while attempting to provide fairly for the latter in “their own areas”.

It was an impossible dream, held for too long. The races were long entwined with each other in economic terms. Apartheid had to fail and it did, the failure grimly covered up by its politicians, thus hurting Africans severely without creating the peaceful co-existence hoped for. It had to be Afrikaners themselves, who had to realize the false fabric of the society they tried to create and to end their defense of the indefensible.

Dr. van Zyl Slabbert was neither the first nor the only Afrikaner who rejected apartheid, but he was the first to make the move towards dialogue with Africans with the aim of overcoming the difference and creating a just society.

Afrikaners wanted desperately to be accepted by Africa, as Mbeki realised when he came to know them. Afrikaners had no other home to go to, as Professor Bernard Lategan said, repeating an often stated claim. (14) They had no ties with Europe and were the first people to call themselves “Afrikaner”. Though they denied blacks the same title for too long, insisting on such labels as “Bantu”, they were overcome with emotion when Mbeki announced at the first ANC-whites gathering in Dakar that “I am an Afrikaner”. (15)

The awareness that change was inevitable, had already been formulated by the *Afrikaner Broederbond*, a secret society born in 1918 to protect Afrikaner interest and was instrumental in forging NP policies. All NP Prime Ministers and many Cabinet Ministers as well as prominent Afrikaners in the Church and civil service were secretly ‘brothers’. The unity of Afrikanerdom had already fragmented within the NP, with *verligtes* - progressives – on one side, *verkrampes* – conservatives – on the other. This fragmentation was increased when in 1981 a new Conservative Party to the right of the NP emerged and was supported by a third of the Afrikaner electorate.

Already in 1986 the *Broederbond* circulated a policy paper on Basic Policy conditions for the continuing survival of the Afrikaner, stating that all parties had to be involved in writing a new constitution. By inference this included the ANC. The paper also stated that blacks should be admitted to the highest government levels, with a black able to become president. In 1989 this was reinforced with a further paper stating guidelines for political dialogue.

It was thus no coincidence that Afrikaner academics from Stellenbosch University were in the vanguard of the move of Afrikaners towards the ANC. It arose out of unease with apartheid and the awareness that change was inevitable. (16) Stellenbosch had been a bastion of Afrikaner nationalism. Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, architect of classic apartheid, had been professor of Sociology, all NP Prime Ministers and many NP Ministers had been educated there. The university had been part of the apartheid system and support for the National Party was strong. Nonetheless, as whites grew restive and opposition to the NP developed, Stellenbosch was also affected, with a small but determined group of academics beginning to work for an end to apartheid. A number of students were even prepared to join the “End Conscription Campaign (EEC)”, which would have been considered pure heresy only a few years before.

The Stellenbosch dissidents were assisted in their endeavours through the pioneer work of IDASA. Professor Johann Kinghorn who began organising tours for fellow academics and students to Soweto and made contact with the South African Council of Churches, a strong anti-apartheid voice, also with Dr. Beyers Naudé and IDASA, the latter contact leading to meetings with liberation movements.

Men such as Professor Bernard Lategan, head of Stellenbosch’s Biblical Studies Department, urged face to face talks with the ANC from the early 80s onwards, accepting that inclusive democracy had to replace the exclusive apartheid system. A new value system had to replace the old, thus a course in Lategan’s department was evolved, the ideology of which was based on philosophy and religious studies, with policy based on political science and sociology.

V. ZIMBABWE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (ZISA)

Van Zyl Slabbert did not return with the group from Dakar, which arrived at Johannesburg’s Jan Smuts airport in the morning of July 21st. A group of rightwing extremists, members of the Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging (AWB - Afrikaner Resistance Movement) under their belligerent leader Eugene Terre’Blanche had gathered as a hostile reception committee, set on violence. As the police could not guarantee their safety, the group travelled to Cape Town.

Despite such antagonism, van Zyl Slabbert together with Thabo Mbeki met President Robert Mugabe and requested permission to hold future meetings in Zimbabwe. Discussion and meetings between South Africans of different races was impossible in South Africa. Zimbabwe, as a near neighbour and newly independent country was the ideal venue for such gatherings.

Relations between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and the ANC were reserved in the early years after independence 1980. The ANC had worked closely with Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, mainly supported by the minority Ndebele group, descendants of

a Zulu breakaway group, with both parties among those regarded by Moscow as “authentic liberation movements”, while ZANU, based on the Shona majority, was excluded from this definition. (This had also led to closer relations between ZANU and PAC, the latter also being excluded from the “authentic” label.)

Following the Unity Accord in 1987 between Mugabe and Nkomo, the frosty relations between ZANU-PF and the ANC thawed. A good deal of underground work in South Africa was organised by exiles in Zimbabwe. Subsequently the ANC-led government, particularly during the Mbeki-era, supported Mugabe as a liberator of his people.

South African investments in and exports to Zimbabwe were the highest in the region. Moreover, as white civil servants remained in their post after independence, relations with some of these and Pretoria continued. South Africa targeted Zimbabwe in the course of its destabilisation programme after 1980, determined to stop incursion from the neighbouring country. The assassination in 1981 of the ANC representative Joe Gqabi was only one of several actions against the ANC inside Zimbabwe, which after independence had become one of the Frontline States and as such supported sanctions against South Africa.

Given these circumstances and his role in the FS group, President Mugabe could not officially bless the IDASA initiative, but unofficially a civil trust close to the government, Cold Comfort Farm Trust (CCFT), of which Mugabe was Hon Chairman), was allowed to provide the umbrella for a new body, the Zimbabwe Institute on Southern Africa (ZISA), the subject of this paper.

ZISA

The President’s close associate Didymus Mutasa was entrusted with the establishment of ZISA. Mutasa, then the first Parliamentary Speaker post-independence, (today Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and Secretary for ZANU-PF Administration and responsible for the so-called land reform) was on the Board of Trustees of CCFT. Mutasa had been the chairman at Cold Comfort Farm (CCF) in the 60s, after the Anglican clergyman Guy Clutton Brock had founded this as a multi-racial agricultural cooperative on a plot some ten kms. outside Salisbury (Harare). CCF, which stood for reconciliation and peace, was expropriated by the Smith regime in 1972, when Mutasa and others were detained and Clutton Brock deported. Mutasa revived CCF after independence with donor funds, hence its trust status.

Dr. Orbon said of ZISA that “politically we were answerable to the Chair of the Cold Comfort Farm Trust, the then Senior Minister for Political Affairs in the Government of Zimbabwe, Hon D.N.E Mutasa. We understand that the programme was requested / recommended by the ANC in cooperation with IDASA as a follow up to the encounter in Dakar, Senegal. Over the next few years we facilitated more than 50 meetings in Harare. Most of the meetings were between the ANC and eminent persons from the white community in South Africa.”(17) Meetings were also organised with PAC and Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO). An initiative of the Zimbabwe government to form a Patriotic Front of all liberation movements did not succeed, though a meeting of representatives from all these organisations was held.

ZISA was thus a child born out of the joint will of the two parties in conflict, the whites as represented by the Afrikaner political and intellectual elite and the ANC. It was conceived as a facility, not as a mediator and a facility it remained.

The project gained the support of various donors. Between 1987 and 1993 Dr. Orbon (as stated in his final 1993 report) mobilised ZS1.1 million (at the time DM 2.5 million), in the main from the Swiss government, also from the EU, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Sida (Sweden). Others including Bonn fought shy of it. The Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ – German Development Ministry) did not get involved. The BMZ is non-political, dealing with all issues from the perspective of development. Given the political climate in Bonn at the time, the German government of the day was not anxious to lock horns with Pretoria, an important trading partner. The scenario for change as envisaged by Bonn at the time would be the result of evolution not revolution, with the “moderate” Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Kwazulu Premier, perceived as the man of the future. Dialogue or negotiations with the ANC, the “terrorists considered to be controlled by communists” was not on the agenda. (18)

Mutasa arranged the extension of a farm building to house ZISA and its staff. CCFT Manager Mark Collier also worked from this building and took over control of ZISA’s finances.

Mutasa further proposed Dr. Helmut Orbon, until then representative of the Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (DED - German Development Service), to act as ZISA’s director, an offer Dr. Orbon accepted. Several non-Zimbabweans, including the South African journalists Moeletsi Mbeki, Ruth Weiss, Mike Overmeyer and Peter Welman were appointed to the staff to protect Zimbabwe’s status as signatory to boycott and sanctions against South Africa. Sadly, both last-named have since passed away.

The difference between ZISA’s operation and meetings organised by other groups was the fact that ZISA arose out of the joint interests of the conflicting sides. ZISA had therefore to be objective and refrain from any direct input, a rule which was strictly adhered to.

Aims of the study on ZISA

The purpose of the study and of interviews conducted with participants at sundry talks is not to write an historic record, but to establish the role of ZISA in the dialogue phase and to consider the purpose of dialogue in the mediation of conflict.

The following questions therefore arose in the course of proposing the study:

1. Could dialogue contribute to conflict resolution and to what extent: Under what circumstances does dialogue make a difference, what was needed to make it possible?
2. Could dialogue be introduced at any stage of conflict resolution or only under special circumstances only, that is, when the conflict has reached a certain stage?

3. Did the location (Zimbabwe) or the venue (Cold Comfort as a non-racial place) have any bearing on the relevance for dialogue?
4. Did the meetings in any way change the agenda of transition from apartheid to democracy?
5. Did dialogue create additional problems for the leadership?
6. What are the lessons learnt for other processes of conflict mediation?
7. Was it worthwhile to urge for and conduct dialogue?

ZISA's tasks

Dr. Orbon was given no specific brief, but the following tasks became clear:

1. Facilitating meetings

Due to South Africa's pariah status and also because of the sensitivity of the contacts and to safeguard participants, ZISA avoided all publicity. Moreover, ZISA's role was not to initiate meetings or set their agenda and at no time did it do so. It saw itself - and acted only - as a facilitator to assist the parties in conflict to move towards a resolution of their differences. This meant, assisting them in getting together for dialogue.

ZISA responded to requests from groups or individuals inside or outside South Africa, who desired to talk to "the other side". If a request came for a meeting with the liberation movements, ZISA took advice from the local representative(s) as to the movement's view of the request. (19)

ZISA thus acted both as a go-between, as well as the organiser of travel arrangements, venues and assisting with - and where applicable funding - travel, local transport and/or accommodation. Many, but by no means all requests originated with IDASA. Thus the Stellenbosch academics requests were addressed directly to ZISA.

By acting as facilitator only, ZISA fulfilled a major condition noted in all successful mediation, namely involving the parties in conflict, without imposing ideas from outside.

The aims of the meetings were varied, ranging from getting to know the other side on a person to person level so as to understand the other's viewpoint, to exploring common ground to discussing preconditions for formal talks and outlining policies following a settlement. However, such considerations lay outside ZISA's mandate.

Between 1987 and 1993, ZISA organised some 50 meetings involving almost one thousand individuals - major conferences, seminars, workshops, individual face-to-face encounters - for numerous participants, whose names sound like a roll-call of who-is-who in South Africa today. The main backers of the project from the ANC side were Thabo Mbeki and the ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo. However, ZISA also hosted meetings with members of other groups including Black Consciousness and PAC.

Dr. Orbon was in the forefront of ZISA activities, responding instantly to requests for meetings, organising travel and venues with the help of secretarial staff, by rendering all backroom assistance. IDASA was not alone in its desire to further dialogue, with many individuals and organisations eager to establish contact with what they perceived to be the future government. Approaches were usually hesitant, always carefully phrased and more often than not made personally. Dr. Orbon at no time took the decision whether or not to accede to the requests; he passed them on to the liberation movements. ZISA compiled no lists of participants or meetings.

2. Issuing background material on South Africa

ZISA also disseminated useful background information, analysis and news on South Africa for the major decision- and opinion-makers in the southern African region, i.e. to Heads of State, politicians, civil servants and other VIPs. A mailing list was not drawn up for this purpose, it evolved over time. The Frontline States, i.e. the countries close to South Africa affected directly by events in that country, whose heads of state met regularly to monitor developments, were in need of accurate information, which ZISA supplied.

Mbeki, Overmeyer and Weiss carried out this mandate after Welman dropped out. They perused daily all publications carrying South African news and analysis and thanks to their own background knowledge were able to prepare background papers on subjects such as the Afrikaner right, homeland structures and leaders, history of the ANC and other parties. In addition they prepared fact sheets and newsletters. The publications were useful in building up archives on South Africa, a job carried out with the help of two Zimbabwe staff. (20)

After Dakar

The memorable Dakar meeting, itself the result of the visit of the Anglo-American Corporation's trip to Zambia in 1985 spawned six other IDASA meetings with the ANC in such venues as Harare, New York, Leverkusen, Berlin, the last taking place in Paris in November 1989. Dr. Slabbert in *The Other Side of History* mentions Leverkusen in particular, a conference held in October 1989 funded by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, where white South Africans met not only ANC communists but 'real live' ones from Russia. Slabbert made friends with one of these, Slava Tetioken, then Secretary General of the Afro Asian Solidarity Commission. (21)

In Harare, meetings began almost instantly after the establishment of ZISA.

One meeting which took place in 1987 was a get-together of both ANC and PAC from in and outside South Africa as well as with white South Africans.

The procedure, as described by Justice Dikgang Moseneke, was typical of ZISA's operation as a facilitator. Moseneke, then an attorney working in South Africa, whose allegiance was to the PAC, was invited by ZISA from Harare as an individual, as were other participants. His name had been supplied to ZISA by the external PAC, just as names such as Valli Moosa (later a member of Mandela's cabinet, today a prominent businessman) or Cyril Ramaphosa (a leading United

Democratic Front, later an important ANC leader and leading negotiator in Codesa, today a successful businessman) had been provided by the external ANC. As both the ANC and PAC were banned inside South Africa, the participants from inside South Africa called themselves SA patriots striving for peace. In Harare they met white South Africans, an event that was unthinkable inside that country. (22)

Zimbabwe's government hoped to mediate between ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness, enabling these three groups to forge a Patriotic Front for coming negotiations, much as Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Mugabe's ZANU had formed a Patriotic Front ahead of Lancaster House in 1979. This did not come about, but Mosenke felt it had been useful to meet comrades from other groups.

The ZISA meetings included some six encounters on economic policies, attended by among others from the ANC side by Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni, Vela Pillay, Alec Erwin, Derek Hanekom and Prof. Sampie Terblanche, all of whom played a major role in the New South Africa.

Various Meetings were also organised between the Economics Department of the ANC and companies such as Anglo American and PG Bison.

There were sundry direct encounters of individuals for example on security issues, which were facilitated by Cold Comfort but organised and implemented directly by the ANC office in Harare, involving Max Mlonjeni, Stan Mabizela and Kingsley Mamabolo on the ANC side. (23)

Women's Conference

A Women's Conference, opened by the late Sally Mugabe, wife of the Zimbabwe President, was a tripartite event, attended by a ZANU-PF Women's League delegation together with some 55 white women and 50 members of the ANC Women's League. Among the latter were Adelaide Tambo, the wife of ANC President, Gertrude Shope, head of the Women's League, Ruth Mompati, Nelson Mandela's one-time secretary, later South Africa's ambassador to Switzerland, Ray Simons, the well-known trade unionist, Barbara Masekele who later was in charge of Mandela's presidential office and Dr. Frene Ginwala, whose long service for the ANC had begun in 1960 and who was to become the first Speaker of the House under a democratic constitution after 1994.

The last-named co-opted Ruth Weiss into the ANC delegation. She thus experienced the impact the conference on the white, mainly Afrikaner women. She found one woman weeping in the Ladies Room, sobbing in reply to Weiss' question, that she couldn't believe that she hadn't known black women such as those at the conference existed. "We've missed so much", she said. Other women were confounded that these sedate women were involved in the armed struggle. The meeting opened the eyes of the Afrikaner women to the fabric of propaganda, which had been woven for them over the decades, demonizing the ANC in particular and black South Africans in general.

One of the white women was Mrs. Jeanette Groenewald, an educationist who had taught at the University of the Western Cape (wife of Stellenbosch Professor Johann Groenewald), had formed an IDASA Women's Group in Stellenbosch. For

her, contact with African women was nothing new. She was also no new convert to opposition to apartheid. Anyone who had witnessed discrimination against and harassment of Coloured students, as she had, clearly understood the dynamics of the politics of the day, as she said in a casual conversation in Stellenbosch on February 17, 2010.

The year 1989 was destined to be the year of transition between conflict and official contact negotiations between warring sides, i.e. the liberation parties and Pretoria. ZISA played a part in the hectic rounds of diplomacy which took place, hosting an increasing number of meetings. One of the most important meetings was a Constitutional Lawyers Conference on the role of law in a society in transition, held in Harare from 31.1. – 4.2.1989

Lawyers meeting on constitutional issues

Professor Gerhard Erasmus, a law professor from Stellenbosch who specialized in constitutional law, was present at Dakar and immediately proposed a constitutional seminar to Dr. Slabbert, who agreed to it.

Erasmus felt it was important to discuss constitutional issues in this fluid transitional situation. As he said, it was not possible to teach constitutional law in the abstract, when so much was changing constitutionally within the region: Zimbabwe became independent in 1980; Namibia was on the verge of independence in 1989. Issues such as a Bill of Rights or Minority Rights were no mere theoretical issues. (24)

Namibian-born Dr. Erasmus was on the drafting committee of legal experts who drew up the Namibian and South African constitutions. (25) Erasmus, a dynamic motor-cycling academic who likes to see practical results, was encouraged by Dr. Slabbert to go ahead with the project. He travelled to various preparatory meetings, both in the UK and in Zambia. He was assisted by two or three others, who occasionally accompanied him on these trips. Professor Dr. Gerhardus F. Lubbe, currently Dean of the Stellenbosch Law Faculty, accompanied him to Harare on a 10-day visit, which also included a day-trip to Lusaka. Dr. Lubbe remembered the experience of being whisked off by plane from Harare to Lusaka without documentation, returning the same way after the meeting with the ANC at the Pamodzi Hotel.

The constitutional seminar, an informal gathering of 32 whites, mainly from the Afrikaner community and 19 ANC leaders as well as members of SWAPO and several Zimbabwe academics, eventually took place in late January to February 1989, around the time the stroke that felled President Botha and opened up channels for dialogue between the liberation movements and whites.

ZISA was the main facilitator, with the backing of the Zimbabwe University's law faculty and some of the funding provided by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The meeting, opened by Zimbabwe Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, was considered important by the participants in the light of the crisis in South Africa, which extended to the constitutional system. Professor Lubbe, who meticulously had kept a file on the conference, confirmed that debate was lively and at a high level. (26)

The final communiqué called for a negotiated end to apartheid and stated inter alia the need for a new constitution, a bill of rights and an independent judiciary. Consensus was reached on the need for all South Africans to enjoy full, equal political, economic, social and cultural rights. (27)

The event brought together eminent academics from various South African universities, apart from Stellenbosch. While the majority were legal experts, there were also professors from disciplines such as political science. Among the participants were Dr. Lourens (Laurie) Ackermann, a former judge of the Supreme Court, who had retired in 1987 to take the chair of the new law department of Human Rights at Stellenbosch established by Harry Oppenheimer. Other well-known lawyers included Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, Marinus Wiechers, Edwin Cameron, today and a Judge on the Constitutional Court. (28)

On the ANC side, the lawyer Albie Sachs attended a meeting for the first time since his discharge from hospital, where he had recovered from a bomb attack, which left him badly handicapped. Participants were impressed by his personality and conciliatory attitude. Other ANC delegates were Nathaniel Masemola, Thabo Mbeki, Professor Jack Simons, Skweyiya, and Steve Thwete. (29) Dr. Lubbe remembered in particular Skweyiya favourably.

The conference came briefly into the public domain through an article in Zimbabwe's *Sunday Mail* of February 5, 1989, which quoted Mbeki as saying that the ANC had drawn up its constitutional guidelines. He acknowledged that an increasing number of South Africans were realising the importance of talking to one another. "But there is no representative of the regime here, so one can't say we have got closer to talking to the regime." (30)

Professor Erasmus was quoted as saying that the meeting afforded participants to be exposed to one another and discuss political and constitutional matters. Twenty years later, he said that he did not think that there was such a thing as a "Harare idea" or concept. While all issues under discussion were important, these were thrashed out at various levels not only at the Harare meeting, but also on other occasions, not least in the sessions of the experts writing South Africa's constitution. Every meeting contributed to better understanding of each other.

While Professor Erasmus warned not to over-estimate the effect of Harare, he thought it important that it could take place at all, after all this was during P.W. Botha's time who disapproved of all such gatherings. The meetings contributed towards better relationships and understanding. Erasmus felt that it was immensely useful that a facility such as CCFT and ZISA was available, enabling meetings such as the Constitutional Seminar to take place in southern Africa. (31) This is understandable given the large number of academics with their load of teaching, researching and writing commitments: it was less complex to fly to Harare than, say, London. Erasmus felt that it was very important that the facility existed to enable many meetings to be held near South Africa.

André Zaaiman

An important ZISA partner was André Zaaiman, responsible for IDASA's student programme. Interviewed in Cape Town on February 24, 2010, Zaaiman said that his brief actually came from the ANC in Lusaka: he had been told to work among the Afrikaner community and that was what he did.

Zaaiman had a conservative Afrikaner background in what was then the Orange Free State province, but already in childhood and youth had begun to question the system of the society in which he was brought up. After his years in the army as an officer, he continued to question himself. He travelled abroad and during that time, came to the conclusion that he had only one option: to join the ANC. He thereupon called at the London office to do just that. He was fortunate he said in getting to the right people: Tambo, Mbeki, Zuma.

He was fortunate to find a job with IDASA. Working with Afrikaner youth, he made friends with student leaders and organized trips for them to Zimbabwe to see a successful black country: to Mozambique to experience a poor country battling with development issues and Namibia, a country only recently independent.

Zaaiman found Helmut Orbon and the ZISA facility immensely useful. Dialogue, he maintained, was an ANC idea and "we ran with it". The aim was to make every South African household aware of the existence of the ANC, an interesting assignment, considering that it was still illegal to mention either a banned organisation or the name of banned persons, a legal taboo, which had been broken since the mid-80s, when the editor in chief of the Cape Times first wrote about Oliver Tambo to the consternation of the authorities.

Zaaiman was eventually banned from all Afrikaans-speaking universities, but this did not dampen his enthusiasm or deter him from continuing his efforts. (32)

ZISA post-1990

President De Klerk's historic speech in February 1990 virtually ended ZISA's initial mandate. It was now possible to meet inside South Africa and several ZISA-organized meetings took place inside the country. Moreover, it was recognised that up-to-date information on events inside South Africa was more vital than ever, as the two sides began official talks-about-talks against a background of open and bloody hostility between the ANC and IFP. Mike Overmeyr was therefore located in the Cape, from where he provided regular factsheets and news items.

The programme was flexible and adjusted to the new situation. It was decided to enable South Africans to experience life in an independent black country, to enable them to take their rightful place in South Africa's modern society. (32) A "Placement" programme was evolved with South African partners, such as universities, as Dr. Orbon explained in his annual 1991 report. When it became evident that 1993 would introduce further moves towards a new dispensation, the programme had run its natural course.

VI. PROCEDURE IN 2009/10 TO CONDUCT AN ANALYSIS of ZISA

In July 2009 the Berlin-based Weltfriedensdienst (WFD – World Peace Service), a non-government organization, decided to conduct an inquiry into ZISA with the twin aims of establishing firstly the extent of ZISA's contribution to the South African negotiations and secondly, whether the ZISA methodology could be useful in other conflict situations.

It was decided to conduct a series of interviews with former participants of meetings organised by ZISA. Some 10-12 interviews were planned and a questionnaire proposed.

The purpose was not to establish a historic record but to define the role and purpose of dialogue in the mediation of conflicts, i.e. attempt to answer some of the questions posed on page 17 above. The request for funding the proposal was granted by the ZFD-Programme of BMZ in October, coming into effect from December to end March 2010.

A planning workshop took place December, 14th, 2009 in Berlin.

The inquiry had to overcome several stumbling blocks:

The time granted by the BMZ was restrictive and allowed for little leeway to trace and contact the individuals involved in the 1987-1990 dialogue. The WFD-Coordinator (Manfred Schumacher-Just) started to take up contact with would-be interviewees from beginning of January 2010, before leaving on January 31st for South Africa together with the interviewer (Ruth Weiss). Schumacher-Just had planned a two-week stay in Johannesburg, with a further two weeks in Cape Town and a brief sojourn in Durban.

Due to the secrecy surrounding ZISA, no official reports were prepared by ZISA. By the same token, ZISA had no copies of the agenda of meetings or lists of participants. Moreover, the current conditions inside Zimbabwe are such, that contact with Minister Mutasa was impossible. Cold Comfort Farm itself was stripped of its former status and exists as a privately held farm. Nonetheless the coordinator planned to visit Zimbabwe in April during which time he hoped to search for the archives.

An additional problem was the situation within the ANC. Even prior to the public knowledge of the Mbeki-Zuma rift, the party and its allied organisations (Cosatu, the SA Communist Party) had been torn apart by it. Factions had been formed, the composition of which was not discernible by outsiders. Following the turbulent 2008 party conference which ousted Mbeki and the subsequent emergence of the new COPE party, many ANC or COPE members were cautious about discussing past events, including the delicate pre-1990 dialogue. Barbara Masekela's remark, that she had sent Dr. Orbon's e-mail to Luthuli House (ANC headquarters) 'for guidance' but had received no reply, indicates the problem. (33)

As some of the interviewees were very important persons such as ex-President Thabo Mbeki, Deputy-Minister Derek Hanekom and ex-Idasa Director Alex Boraine, these and other short-term interviews were impossible to arrange. Moreover, the contact addresses of other would-be interviewees were difficult to ascertain at short notice.

In view of the lapse of time (20 years since Mandela's release from prison), a number of participants were no longer living such as Oliver Tambo and Alfred Nzo or were too ill such as Dr. van Zyl Slabbert to be interviewed, others' whereabouts could not easily be established.

In Johannesburg, further contact had to be made by the co-ordinator with prospective interviewees. This proved difficult, as everyone close to government was involved with the 20th anniversary of the De Klerk speech and Mandela's release.

As a result of all these factors, the emphasis of the interviews was on the white side, with five interviewees being University of Stellenbosch professors. They were representative of other academics, who had become convinced that constitutional change was essential. Five ANC members could be contacted, of whom one was openly pro-Zuma and anti-dialogue at the time, two were only available for short conversations and one (white) had been a covert ANC member at the time.

This is a shortcoming of the analysis as of March 22, 2010. There is not sufficient input from the ANC side, with Thabo Mbeki's voice missing in particular. Also that of Dr. Boraine would be important: Dr. Orbon reported that immediately after Didymus Mutasa broached the question of a project based at CCF, he called Dr. Boraine, who was still in the vicinity and who joined in the discussion and was thus involved with ZISA from the very start.

To explain the need for ANC leadership voices, it is necessary to grasp the tensions within the ANC then and now.

Tension within the ANC

In February 2010, twenty years after the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and return of the exiled ANC leadership, one of the former Rivonia prisoners took issue with ex-President Mbeki over the pre-1990 talks. Mbeki had mentioned that official talks began with talks in Switzerland, referring to a meeting in September 1989 between Jacob Zuma and himself in Switzerland with two South African intelligence officers. Andrew Malange pointed out that Mandela had first made contact with the Botha regime.

Both are right: Mandela's bold approach was the first move an ANC leader had made towards the Pretoria administration, while Mbeki's Swiss talks were the first official talks between the ANC and the then government.

The brief public exchange gave another glimpse of the rift within the ANC, which had erupted publicly at the turbulent 2008 Conference at Polokwane to oust the then President Thabo Mbeki as ANC leader. The latter had been at the centre of the pre-1990 efforts to establish dialogue between the ANC and Pretoria. As various individuals, who had been players during this pre-negotiation phase, have since written or spoken of the events with varying emphasis, the interpretation as to who met whom and why, has become a sensitive issue.

Even the actions during 1989/1990 period by the then President De Klerk is viewed differently by different individuals. Twenty years on, the ANC's party line tended to negate the significance of De Klerk's move to unban illegal parties and release Mandela to allow negotiations to begin which led four years later to a democratic constitution. For this bold act De Klerk, jointly with Nelson Mandela, received the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet in February 2010 President Zuma was quoted as stating that it was the people who had freed Mandela, implying that the pressure from within and outside South Africa had forced De Klerk to act as he did - an ungenerous view? De Klerk took an enormous risk that might well have gone wrong. The speech on February 2, 1990 had undoubtedly opened a new page in South Africa's history book. President De Klerk's announcements could not be reversed and set the scene for the New South Africa.

Bold it was. Despite De Klerk's assertion that he had everyone firmly behind him, there appears to have been little, if any consultation with his cabinet, party or Broederbond, with even the military left out in the cold.⁽³⁴⁾ Possibly De Klerk would have been blocked, had he widely consulted everyone. As it was, there had been the danger of the military taking power in its own hands. However, General George Meiring, head of the army, refrained from action, not being anxious to unleash a bloodbath. Besides, the generals had previously advised the politicians that the problems could never be solve militarily, so that a political solution had to be found.

Within the ANC there had been a tug-of-war over the issue of dialogue and negotiated peace. A faction around military figures such as Chris Hani and Joe Slovo tended to advocate that it was necessary to smash the regime militarily (without considering the advantage of taking over a stable economy and infrastructure), with others such as Thabo Mbeki showed a preference for a peaceful transfer of power, while advocating a continuation of the armed struggle. Subsequently – and still today – there is criticism about the negotiated settlement, seen as giving too much away and favouring 'big business'. Criticism continued into Mbeki's presidency regarding its neo-liberal policies and the creation of a black business elite and avaricious middle class, with the poor majority left out in the cold.

It is thus important to hear Mbeki's views on ZISA, the usefulness and importance he attached to it at the time, also how he reviews it in retrospect.

VII. INTERVIEWS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 2009 AND FEBRUARY 2010

In the course of a private visit to Johannesburg in November 2010, Ruth Weiss spoke to three individuals who had been concerned with dialogue in the 80s: Journalists Hugh Lewin, then in exile in Harare, who had attended media meetings at ZISA but did not comment as to its importance, Allister Sparks who had been at the Dakar meeting and had subsequently written about the secret talks pre-1990 and attached more importance to the ANC-government talks; Moeletsi Mbeki, who had worked at ZISA and who pointed out the current delicate nature of the dialogue issue.

She also met Dr. Orbon in Stellenbosch, where they spoke to Professor Johann Kinghorn, who had been the first Stellenbosch academic to organise meetings with anti-apartheid groups and with Professor Jaques du Plessis, from the Department of Private and Roman Law, who had been one of the students in the 1988 group visiting Lusaka and subsequently Harare. It had been a tremendous experience for the latter to meet “terrorists” and discover they were likable human people; but he hadn’t understood why they insisted on “armed struggle”, when to his mind all could be settled by negotiation.

In February 2010 the following interviews were conducted:

Lengthy interviews with **Justice Dikgang Moseneke, Dr. Helmut Orbon;**
a telephone interview with the **Hon. Frene Ginwala;**
a conversation with the **Hon. Barbara Maseke.**

Talks also took place with the representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation Hubertus von Welck and a member of the German Embassy in Pretoria, Stephan Ohme, Head of Development Cooperation at the German Embassy, who had been in Harare at the time of ZISA.

In Cape Town the celebration of freeing Mandela on February 9th and the opening of Parliament on February 15th made access to ANC Members of Parliament and the Cabinet difficult. Thus Deputy Minister Derek Hanekom who had hoped to find time for a meeting, was taken up with official duties during the first week of the team’s stay in Cape Town and left on a foreign trip immediately afterwards. Pallo Jordan, who too had tentatively promised an appointment, was taken up with other matters, as he was nominated for a UN post by President Zuma during that time. Also a telephone contact to Vally Moosa did not materialise towards an interview.

Five Stellenbosch professors involved in ZISA dialogue meetings were available for interviews: **Gerhard Erasmus, Johann Groenewald, Bernard Lategan, G.F. Lubbe, Colin McCarthy** (also a brief conversation with Dr. Jeanette Groenewald)

Andrè Zaaiman, an ANC member now a successful businessman in Cape Town, who, as stated above, was responsible for IDASA’s student programme in ZISA’s time. Denis Goldberg was also contacted.

In Durban, the ANC lawyer **Phyllis Naidoo** as well as **MacMaharaj**, an important ANC leader, were able to meet the interviewer.

To sum up:

Five respondents were ANC members,

One PAC member,

Five Stellenbosch professors,

Three of the respondents had been present in at Dakar, all attended one or more meeting in Harare

VIII. QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW RESPONSES

The proposed questionnaires (attached) could rarely be fully used, for instances in the interview with Justice Moseneke. Only Prof. Lubbe had kept notes and papers, while other respondents recalled few details, so that they were unable to reply to the questions listed, thus:

Phyllis Naidoo's memory was impaired, Prof. McCarthy only recalled the Harare economic meeting vaguely while remembering other conferences well, Prof. Erasmus had organized the major constitutional conference but had forgotten all details, André Zaaiman had organized numerous trips for Afrikaner students to Harare, but talked only in general terms about these, though for him the facility was of great importance. Professors Groenewald and Lategan had also not kept any notes and spoke more of the background than the actual meetings. Mac Maharaj was not at any Harare gathering, while Barbara Masekele could not recall the women's conference she had attended and Frene Ginwala viewed the Harare meetings as those in a series of others held during this time of transition.

Unfortunately the interviews were heavily weighted on the white side, thanks to the Stellenbosch academics, with insufficient weight on ANC leadership, which hopefully can still be rectified by interviews with such VIPs as Thabo Mbeki added.

Interviews were recorded and due to error in speech, mishearing of names and other problems, transcripts were edited.

Interviewees also spoke informally over a cup of coffee or a meal, with some remarks subsequently noted by interviewer.

Questions to white South Africans:

What motivated you to participate in meetings in Harare organized by ZISA?

All respondents felt that change had to come.

What was your relationship with IDASA?

Only André Zaaiman had a relationship with IDASA, his employer.

With what expectations did you come to Zimbabwe?

None of the academics came with specific expectations.

At which meeting(s) did you participate?

Professors Erasmus, Lubbe were at the Jan. 1989 constitutional conference, Prof. McCarthy at one economic conference, Prof. Lategan thought he was at least twice in Harare, Professor Groenewald in Oct. 1989.

How do you evaluate such meetings with hindsight?

All five academics had positive recollections of the meetings. Prof. Erasmus thought they contributed to better relations and understanding. Prof. Groenewald said the meetings were important and meaningful for them, as it made them feel that they were participating in peaceful change.

Did these change your perception of the opposing party or individuals?

Prof. Lubbe spoke of tension at the constitutional conference which was dispelled during the meeting; Prof. Lategan: the important thing was that they realised the ANC was serious about setting up a workable government and that the 'other side' discovered that Afrikaners were serious about being part of the future without precondition. For him the Harare meetings shattered previous stereotypes, he thought Africans also had to change their view of Afrikaners. One did not change one's perceptions by being nice to one another, but by talking to one another.

Did you develop any kind of relationship with any individual?

Prof. Lategan said that friendships were formed and as this had happened at a difficult time, these were friendships for life, and he mentioned people such as Frank Chikane and Essop Pahad.

Did they reduce any fears you may have had previously?

Professor Groenewald spoke of his students' fears before meeting the ANC and that these were dispelled, as in the case of a female student who wept after meeting Mbeki. Prof. Lategan said there was a great deal of mistrust which was only broken down through several meetings.

Did you find much common ground with the opposing side?

All five professors had found common ground in that they all had the same aim, that of finding a peaceful solution

Did you discuss pre-conditions to negotiations?

Pre-conditions from the African side were obvious (as stated by Justice Moseneke), i.e.: end of the state of emergency, release of political prisoners, one person-one vote; while Professor Lubbe spoke of the Bill of Rights demanded by whites which was fully discussed at the January 1989 constitutional conference

Did you think that stumbling blocks could be removed to enable negotiations to proceed?

The lawyers among the academics felt that a peaceful transition was possible

Did your experience and that of other whites affect public opinion in South Africa?

The Dakar meeting was given wide publicity and though this was adverse, several of the academics felt it gave people food for thought, that Afrikaner intellectuals were meeting the ANC.

Did you subsequently discuss your experiences with officials?

Prof. Lategan thought that some of those present discussed the meeting with Pretoria officials, mentioning that Prof. Esterhuysen spoke to Mbeki with the consent of Pretoria.

Did any of the views expressed serve as input into the subsequent official talks?

Prof. Erasmus said the ideas discussed in Harare were also discussed elsewhere and flowed into negotiations though not, as Dr. Orbon put it, on a one-to-one basis.

Do you think such contacts helped subsequent official talks to succeed?
Prof. Lategan saw the Harare and other meetings as practice rounds for Kempton Park, i.e. negotiations.

Did any of the issues discussed form an input subsequently in talks about talks, negotiations or legislation - if so in which way?

This was already phrased and answered above.

What did you think of ZISA's work?

Prof. Lategan summed his view up by saying:

The important contribution was that Cold Comfort provided a venue where opposing parties and individuals could meet in a way where stereotypes from both sides could be challenged and where it was possible to at least start to think differently about one another. That I think was their most important contribution. They did not have any power, they did not have any specific position, but they facilitated these meetings. And in the longer run of things, I think it was absolutely essential for South Africans to know one another, because of the isolated positions. Cold Comfort did not take a side, certainly they had their own personal conviction but they took great care of making it possible for people from totally opposing view points to meet in a way, that nobody had thought possible. It was not in a sense that you are put in the position of the accused and you are being bombarded with accusations. It was a genuine attempt to start dialogue.

André Zaaiman said a number of people came together who all wanted the same thing and they did "an amazing, wonderful thing".

Did ZISA present an honest platform for dialogue?

Prof. Lategan answered this above.

Were you interested in Zimbabwe as a newly independent state?

Several respondents considered this very important including Profs. Lategan, Groenewald, Justice Moseneke, André Zaaiman.

What did you expect from ZISA's coordinators?

None had specific expectations.

What kind of programme had you expected?

Some had been involved in producing the agenda; such as Profs. Erasmus and Lubbe for the constitutional conference.

Who proposed the meeting as well as subject matter for discussion and worked out the agenda?

Prof. Lategan mentioned Prof. Johann Kinghorn as the pioneer of the idea of talking to the ANC.

With hindsight, what contribution did the meetings provide for the transformation?
The five academics were agreed that ZISA made a contribution by providing a venue for talks.

In your view, did the concept of reconciliation as symbolised by Cold Comfort Farm play any part?

None were aware of CCF's political significance within Zimbabwe.

Do you consider it useful to form a network of those engaged in ZISA meetings at the time? (For instance, a gathering of former participants?)

Profs. Erasmus, Lategan and Groenewald said they would be prepared to attend a workshop on dialogue as a method to work towards a conflict resolution, if it fitted into their programme.

Questions for anti-apartheid participants:

The questions were only put to Justice Moseneke, as Naidoo, Ginwala, Masekele had little recollection and Maharaj was not in Harare

What motivated you to attend a meeting or meetings in Harare?

Justice Moseneke said that PAC had given his name to the organizers in Harare.

Of which organisation were you a member at the time?

PAC

Who proposed the meeting as well as subject matter for discussion and worked out the agenda?

He thought ZISA as host had some responsibility.

Which meeting (s) did you attend?

He attended several meetings, the first in 1987.

What did you expect from the meeting (s)?

His expectation ahead of the first meeting was not high.

With hindsight, can you evaluate the meeting (s) as follows:

He said ZISA played an important role that would help to begin discussion in Harare about the possibility of facilitating change other than in a violent way.

Did these change your perception of the opposing party or individuals?

He did change his views about some of the whites as in time mistrust was reduced, in particular concerning prominent businessmen who he thought genuinely wanted change.

Did you develop any kind of relationship with any individual?

He became acquainted with men such as Mike Spicer of Anglo American Corporation..

Did the meeting reduce any fears you may have had previously?

It reduced mistrust.

Did you fully approve of a negotiated settlement before the meeting?

Justice Moseneke said it was PAC policy not to give up the armed struggle but to talk and fight at the same time..

Did the meeting make you realise what the effect of a successful outcome of negotiations would mean for your party and yourself?

He felt the Harare meetings opened a way to discussing peaceful change.

Did you any common ground with the opposing side?

Both were serious about peaceful change.

Did you discuss pre-conditions to negotiations?

He felt pre-conditions were obvious, namely the end of the state of emergency, release of prisoners, unbanning banned organisations

Did you think that stumbling blocks could be removed to enable negotiations to proceed?

The pre-conditions were stumbling blocks.

Did your experience affect your friends and comrades?

He thought that the Pretoria officials were affected by the tenor of the talks.

Did you subsequently discuss your experiences with your party officials?

This was not asked as it was obvious that as party deputy chairman he had done so.

Did any of the views expressed serve as input into the subsequent official talks?

He said nitty-gritty issues were not discussed. Justice Moseneke was later member of the drafting committee of the constitution.

Do you think such contacts helped subsequent official talks to succeed?

He had made friends and kept contact with some.

Did any of the issues discussed form an input subsequently in talks about talks, negotiations or legislation? If so, in which way

See response to question above.

What did you think of ZISA's work? Did ZISA present an honest platform for dialogue?

See above response that he considered ZISA's work important.

Were you interested in Zimbabwe as a newly independent state?

He said that it was one reason for going, because they were going to Zimbabwe, a successful country, well run "they are self reliant and many things were working pretty well. That gave us hope."

What did you expect from ZISA's coordinators?

See above, that his expectations were not high.

What kind of programme had you expected?

He said a reason for going was to discuss issues that could not be discussed inside South Africa.

With hindsight, do you think the meetings contributed to the transformation?

He said he had no doubt that the Harare talks made an impact on formal talks. The value was that the talks informed each side what are the obstacles and what was possible and what could be achieved.

In your view, did the concept of reconciliation as symbolised by Cold Comfort Farm play any part?

He was unaware of CCF as a symbol.

Do you consider it useful to form a network of those engaged in ZISA meetings at the time? (e.g., a one-off gathering of former participants?)

He said he would be interested to attend a workshop discussing conflict resolution if his programme allowed it.

Summary of interviews

Professor Gerhard Erasmus, constitutional lawyer, had organised the first Constitutional Conference, in preparation of which he travelled to various countries in the period between 1987 and 1989. For details he referred to Professor Gerhard F. Lubbe, now head of the Stellenbosch Law Faculty, who fortunately had kept a file of papers and his notes, the only one to do so. It was important for him that an organisation – ZISA – was available in Southern Africa to facilitate and host conferences. He warned that ZISA’s role in dialogue-negotiations should not be over-estimated, but that it was important nonetheless, above all because it allowed the conference to take place in Southern Africa.

Frene Ginwala and Barbara Masekela, both senior ANC leaders, saw ZISA as one of the paving stones in ANC’s policy of dialogue, with little recall of detail of the women’s conference, which both had attended.

Ginwala said the meeting had been important. It had been part of a process begun in the early 80s, that of talking to people inside. There was a groundswell inside the country and talks were in the air, with different departments inside the National government anxious to take control of these. Eventually the National Intelligence Service became involved and events unfolded.

Masekela was at the Dakar meeting, which she saw as an important breakthrough. She had made friends and felt many views previously held were dispersed thanks to the face to face meeting. She considered the Harare women’s meeting as part of the flurry of meetings they all attended during that time.

Johann Groenewald, sociologist, gave an account of his visits to Lusaka and a meeting in Harare in October 1989, which was a follow-up to the Lusaka trip. He thought the ZISA meetings made a positive contribution, he felt that it gave the academics the sense that they were doing something meaningful, as none of them were individuals who would have taken up arms but were looking for ways towards peaceful change. He believed in the “human agency” towards transition and negotiation. The impact on him was to make him more outspoken and also to question, what he could do. In the event it made him get down to writing about the issues.

Jeanette Groenewald, wife of Prof. Groenewald who briefly joined the discussion, had worked as an educationist at the University of Western Cape at the time of the non-white student unrests in the 80s and had seen the way police treated and provoked the students. As mentioned, she was at the women's conference in Harare.

Bernard Lategan, theologian, described the place of Stellenbosch within Afrikaner society. Support of the government was still very strong, but there was opposition and a sense of change in the air. His department of Biblical studies had established a new value system to assist the transition to a new dispensation of an inclusive democracy to replace apartheid. He mentioned his then colleague Prof. Esterhuysen who, he thought, talked to Mbeki and had been sanctioned by both sides to do so. Other colleagues outside the university were approached and following Dakar, he himself attended a meeting in Harare. He felt this and other meetings were important in paving the way to a peaceful transition. Cold Comfort had contributed to this by training people in dialogue "to get a constructive engagement". He acknowledged that some relationships forged at that time became friendships for life. It was a "wonder" that a negotiated settlement had been found without bloodshed. In his dealings between management and workers at companies, he found that giving respect was important.

Gerhard F. Lubbe, legal expert on contract law, current Dean of the Stellenbosch University Law Faculty had kept a file on the Constitutional Conference of January 1989, at which the Bill of Rights issue was the underlying theme. He described Thabo Mbeki as the dominant figure who kept everyone focussed on the issue of effecting transition. Albie Sachs attended the meeting, his first public commitment following his discharge from hospital after an assassination attempt. He felt that the mistrust at the start of the conference was dispelled and that the atmosphere was very cordial; there was a good deal of socialising. Prof. Lubbe also mentioned a visit to Lusaka with Prof. Erasmus as part of the preparation for the January 1989 meeting. Usually he said there were two sides to every issue, but in the South African case it was clear who was in the wrong and that this had to change.

Mac Maharaj, senior ANC leader, was adamant that the series of meetings in the last days of apartheid were to serve no other purpose but to demystify the perception of the ANC. He also maintained that his movement did not identify Afrikaners as responsible for the situation, but had correctly defined the enemy as racism, which had already existed at the time of the British. Apartheid was used as a convenient peg on which to hang the struggle against racism. With regard to a paper he had written on transition, he felt that the Berghof Institute was wrong to see an overall solution to conflict possible, he felt each case differed from the next and needed its own solution.

Maharaj's emphasis in the interview on South Africa's secret service is explained by his experience: he was despatched by Oliver Tambo in the late 80s to work under Operation Vula, an attempt to infiltrate top ANC leadership into South Africa to direct the internal unrest and establish an intelligence network. Apart from his presence in Dakar, he was not involved in dialogue and is said to be in the faction which opposed talks. He is an outspoken opponent of Mbeki and a Zuma supporter. Maharaj was in the country clandestinely when the exiles returned, left it

secret to return openly, only to be arrested because of his Vula activities. He was later released and amnestied.

Professor Colin McCarthy, economist who had attended a major economic conference in Konstanz and others in the UK, could barely remember his Harare visit, which for him was one in a series of on-going dialogue events. He thought it was good to have been held in a 'normal' society.

Dikgang Moseneke, then PAC deputy chairman, now Chief Justice of Constitutional Court attended his first meeting in 1987. He felt ZISA played an important role to help establish contact in order to begin talks. Mistrust existed at first and was dispelled only gradually. Whites wanted a Bill of Rights and human rights protection, Africans insisted on preconditions such as lifting of state of emergency, release of political prisoners, unbanning of banned organisations.

He had found it useful to have made the acquaintance of important business leaders such as Anglo American's Mike Spicer, so that he could call him up and ask for help in specific circumstances. To call it friendship would be putting too high a value on it. He felt the Harare talks were useful in furthering talks about talks.

Helmut Orbon, then ZISA Director, explained the establishment, aims and work of ZISA, the latter falling into two parts, organising meetings and disseminating information about South Africa. He saw ZISA only as a facility established at the behest of the ANC and IDASA, which at no time initiated meetings, but responded only to requests. All requests for meetings with liberation movements were referred to the latter for decision. He felt friendships had developed out of ZISA meetings and realisation that reality was richer than confrontation between good and evil.

Following De Klerk's February speech, exchange programmes were introduced to expose South Africans to life and work in black African countries.

Andrè Zaaiman had stated publicly in 1986 that he had given up his commission in the SADF, feeling that he could not defend the indefensible. He secretly joined the ANC and worked for IDASA as manager of its student programme. For him, the ZISA facility had been an important help in his work organising trips outside South Africa, also because it was situated in a neighbouring country which was independent and African-ruled.

IX. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM INTERVIEWS

1. De-mystifying the ANC

All the respondents were positive in their assessment of dialogue and the ZISA meetings. Mac Maharaj insisted that from the ANC's point of view no further purpose was intended or achieved in the long series of meetings with regime officials and civil society than to de-demonise, de-mystify the ANC in the minds of white South Africans. He took part in Dakar, but shortly after that was immersed in Operation Vula, a dangerous assignment, which meant he was working illegally and underground in South Africa.

The de-mystification succeeded, as the experience of Professor Groenewald proved. The students who had accompanied him and three other academics to Lusaka in 1988 had been very fearful of meeting the dreaded ANC communist-terrorists. Yet Steve Thwete approached them with smiles and talk of rugby which overwhelmed the young men. Groenewald himself was overwhelmed when he was welcomed by the much hated Joe Slovo, who gave him a video of his daughter's film *Worlds Apart*, the story of a little girl growing up in a politicised household, which impressed him as well as the students.

He also mentioned the experience of one student, who travelled with him to Harare, where she met ANC leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, an experience that caused her to collapse in a flood of tears: these were people, who in the estimation of her conservative family, belonged behind bars (and whom she had experienced as humans not monsters). Pretoria's anti-ANC propaganda had done its job well and the discovery that the "enemy" had a human face proved emotional.

The meetings had other effects as well:

2. Owning negotiation process

Mac Maharaj felt the success of the South African negotiations was the fact that no outside mediator was involved, so that the South Africans "owned" their own process.

3. Finding common ground

Both Justice Moseneke and Dr.Orbon said that both sides found areas in which they agreed, as both had the same aim, that of a peaceful South Africa.

4. Breaking down mistrust

Given the unstable internal situation, Africans, who travelled to Harare from inside the country such as Moseneke, were apprehensive about face to face meetings with whites for the first time. However, as first overtures in a neutral environment began, mistrust broke down over time.

Justice Moseneke explained that this first meeting in 1987 had been very important, though he couldn't talk of friendship or complete trust. He also found it important to get to know prominent businessmen who were genuinely interested in change. It proved to be useful to be able to approach a man such as Anglo American's Mike Spicer, who was able to ameliorate a crisis situation or help with projects.

Moseneke was later on the drafting committee of the interim constitution but (being PAC) had not taken part in the constitutional meeting in January 1989.

5. Building new friendships

New friendships were also forged between ANC exile leaders and white South Africans. Thus Barbara Masekela was impressed by the journalist and writer Antje Krog with whom she made friends. In Dakar she also became friendly with Dr. van Zyl Slabbert and when she was appointed Ambassador to France, she took his

daughter with her. She spoke of yearning for home during her long years of exile and how a South African accent heard in some foreign country made her feel emotional. For her the emotional impact of Dakar was tremendous.

Professor Bernard Lategan, who attended some three meetings in Harare, said that the stereotype perception of blacks held by Afrikaners was broken down through the face to face contacts. He said that friendships were forged “for life” as a result of the shared discussions and finding common ground.

Thabo Mbeki acknowledged his friendship with some of the whites he met in the course of his meetings. This included van Zyl (though this broke down in the late 90s, as Dr. Van Zyl explained in his book *The Other Side of History*).

6. Acquiring new insights

Professor Bernard Lategan recalled one meeting he attended in Harare, when a two-hour fluent presentation was made by a Russian officer, part of a delegation from the Soviet Embassy, who gave a lucid account of Moscow’s role in Angola, explaining Soviet reason for support against colonial oppression and providing moral grounds for Moscow’s stance, which gave him a new insight.

7. Meeting other activists

ANC, PAC and Black Consciousness representatives met each other in Harare at ZISA meetings, which helped to soften the antagonism between them, as Moseneke experienced. Even if the Patriotic Front envisaged by the ZANU-PF government did not materialise, improved relations with rivals was a positive effect.

8. Developing new diplomatic skills.

The ANC headquarter staff in Lusaka, which some commentators described as a government-in-waiting, was stretched to deal with the requests made on their time and for their presence, especially during 1989 (as mentioned by Barbara Masekela). Officials had to learn quickly to represent their movement and its policy adequately, thus grooming them for the official talks ahead. Mbeki had been involved in diplomacy longest and more than most others, but he too benefitted: van Zyl described in *The Other Side of History* that after 1990 it was of great importance that the Afrikaner right and Afrikaner farmers were brought on board for negotiations to succeed. He was able to get Mbeki and Zuma to engage these groups and also to persuade General Constand Viljoen and Mangosuthu Buthelezi to participate in the elections. (33)

Mbeki had got to know the Afrikaner establishment through the IDASA-ZISA contacts, which helped with these later encounters with the Afrikaner righ..

9. Spelling out pre-conditions for talks

Justice Moseneke said that pre-conditions for negotiations were discussed, even if these were self evident such as the end of the state of emergency or release of political prisoners and unbanning banned organisations.

10. Affecting public opinion inside South Africa

The meetings between Afrikaner establishment and the ANC had an impact on the general public as well as on Pretoria. Coverage of the Dakar meeting, though on the whole adverse, nonetheless made an impression, with people interested that the intellectual elite should be meeting “terrorists”.

Pretoria officials were aware of the talks. Dr. Groenewald said that they knew someone within their group would report to some official, but this caused no headaches, as they wanted it made known that they were meeting the ANC. The effect on public opinion was positive, even if the Dakar participants were bullied on their return. Dr. Orbon said the meetings helped to de-sensitise the issue of future negotiations. It also legitimised these within the apartheid opposition in general and the ANC membership in particular by holding out visions of the reward of a settlement, thus encouraging pro-negotiation positions.

X. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED TO ZISA

The interviews provide some answers to questions posed on page 17 above:

1. Can dialogue contribute to conflict resolution and if so, to what extent?

Respondents saw dialogue as a means of getting acquainted (Moseneke, Masekela, Groenewald).

2. Under what circumstances does dialogue affect the situation and what is required to make dialogue possible?

Dialogue became possible once external events had changed the situation of both sides.

In the case of South Africa it was the fall of the Berlin Wall i.e. the end of the Cold War.

3. Can dialogue be instituted at any time in a conflict situation or only under special circumstances, e.g. when the conflict has reached a certain stage?

The Broederbond papers of 1986 and 1989 show that this policy-making think tank realised constitutional changes made by President Botha had reached a dead end.

4. Did the location (Zimbabwe) or the venue (Cold Comfort as a symbol of non-racialism) have any relevance in the South African dialogue which took place under ZISA's aegis?

Several respondents saw Zimbabwe as a venue as important, as it showed that blacks could run a country and run it well. (Andre Zaaiman, Bernard Lategan, Johann Groenewald, Bernhard Erasmus) Zaaiman in particular considered it important that the ZISA facility was close to South Africa.

5. Did the meetings in any way change the agenda of transition from apartheid to democracy?

Not as such. Respondents felt that change was inevitable by the 80s (Professors Lubbe, Erasmus, Groenewald).

6. Did dialogue create additional problems for the leadership?

The ANC leadership was badly stretched to respond to all the calls time of its small headquarter contingent (Frene Ginwala, Barbara Masekela); Dialogue posed a problem for Pretoria, which could not stop participation at meetings outside its borders (Andre Zaaiman).

7. What are the lessons learnt for other processes of conflict mediation

Mac Maharaj thought the most important lesson was that the protagonists must “own” the process, that is, no outside interference. Others felt that dialogue contributed to the success of official negotiations.

8. Was it all worth while?

All interviewees replied in the affirmative, they all saw ZISA as one of the segments in the dialogue process of the late ‘80s.

Perhaps it is best to allow of the respondents the last word. Professor Lategan said:

“The important contribution was that Cold Comfort provided a venue where opposing parties and individuals could meet in a way where stereotypes from both sides could be challenged and where it was possible to at least start to think differently about one another. That I think was their most important contribution. They did not have any power; they did not have any specific position, but they facilitated these meetings. And in the longer run of things, I think it was absolutely essential for South Africans to know one another, because of the isolated positions. Cold Comfort did not take a side, certainly they had their own personal conviction but they took great care of making it possible for people from totally opposing view points to meet in a way, that nobody had thought possible. It was not in a sense that you are put in the position of the accused and you are being bombarded with accusations. It was a genuine attempt to start dialogue.”

Andrè Zaaiman speaking about the processes of dialogue and negotiation said: **It was a glorious moment when a group of serious committed people, who shared an objective, came together in their own ways, in their own spaces and focussed and did a beautiful thing and achieved an amazing thing.”** About ZISA he said that without it, it would have been more difficult: **“The good thing about ZISA - it was there.”**

XI. CAN ZISA SERVE AS A MODEL IN OTHER AREAS OF CONFLICT?

The question whether ZISA as a model can be applied elsewhere is doubtlessly the key issue – that is, establishing a facility in the case of conflict solutions without outside mediation.

Dr. Orbon's remark that ZISA was the right project at the right time at the right place actually highlights the problem: who can answer beforehand if anything is the right thing at the right time? In the case of ZISA, various issues happened to fit:

In the wake of a successful first encounter, both parties, whites and the liberation movements, were in favour of a facility in a neutral country where they could meet;

Zimbabwe as a frontline state was directly concerned with the conflict: like all frontline states President Mugabe's selfinterest was involved in desiring a peaceful solution;

Zimbabwe's recent independence and the President's speech of reconciliation encouraged the whites to pursue the possibility of dialogue with their opponents; Zimbabwe's closeness to South Africa's borders made it possible for meetings to be arranged at short notice.

ZISA's recipe for success was its objectivity, that it served as a facility only. None of the individuals involved allowed their personal views to impinge on their work. Meetings were held at the request of the parties in conflict without ZISA input. The Zimbabwe government once did attempt to propose a solution, a patriotic front of anti-apartheid groups, which failed.

If a "ZISA-structure" is proposed in any area of conflict, it has to be the will of both sides that this should happen. A neutral spot close to the area of conflict with disinterested personnel, prepared to remain objective, would have to be available, as well as generous funding over a lengthy period.

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|---|
| AB | Afrikaner Broederbond |
| AWB | Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| AZAPO | Azanian Peoples Organisation |
| BCM | Black Consciousness Movement |
| BMZ | Bundesministerium f. Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Development Ministry) |
| CCF | Cold Comfort Farm |
| CCFT | Cold Comfort Farm Trust |
| CP | Conservative Party |
| EEC | End Subscription Campaign |
| FS | Frontline States |
| IDASA | Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa |
| MK | Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) ANC military wing |
| NIS | National Intelligence Service |
| NP | National Party |
| PAC | Pan Africanist Congress |
| PFPP | Progressive Federal Party |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SADCC | Southern African Development Co-operation Conference |
| UDF | United Democratic Front |
| ZISA | Zimbabwe Institute on Southern Africa |

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ANALYSE DER INTERVIEWS IN HINSICHT
AUF KRITERIEN ZUR ÜBERTRAGBARKEIT
DES ZISA-DIALOGANSATZES
AUF VERGLEICHBARE PROZESSE
DER KONFLIKTBEARBEITUNG
ANDERER ZFD-PROJEKTE

KAREN JOHNE

März 2010

Analyse der Interviews in Hinsicht auf Kriterien zur Übertragbarkeit des ZISA-Dialogansatzes auf vergleichbare Prozesse der Konflikttransformation anderer ZFD-Projekte

Mit seinem Projekt „Die Rolle und der Beitrag des Zimbabwe Institute for Southern Africa (ZISA) im südafrikanischen Konfliktlösungsprozess sowie die Übertragbarkeit der Erfahrungen auf andere Konfliktlösungsprozesse“ möchte der WFD zwanzig Jahre nach dem gewaltfreien Ende des Apartheidregimes untersuchen, welche Anteile daran ZISA¹ hatte und ob es Aspekte dieses spezifischen ZISA-Ansatzes gibt, die als „lessons learned“ auch in anderen Konflikten Anwendung finden könnten.

In einer ersten Projektphase (vom 31.01.- 24.02.2010) führten Ruth Weiss und Manfred Schumacher Interviews mit an ZISA-Meetings beteiligten AkteurInnen des friedlichen Transformationsprozesses in Südafrika durch. Diese sollten die Grundlage für ein praxisorientiertes Handbuch darstellen, in dem für ZFD-PraktikerInnen in anderen Konfliktkonstellationen sowie für FriedensforscherInnen Anregungen, Zugänge und Praxisbeispiele auf Grundlage der von ZISA gemachten Erfahrungen gegeben werden sollten.

Folgende Fragestellungen sollten diesbezüglich als Leitlinien gelten:

1. Haben die Dialogveranstaltungen einen Beitrag zum Transformationsprozess leisten können und wenn ja, welchen?
2. Welche Rahmenbedingungen haben diesen Prozess gefördert oder behindert?
3. In welcher Weise haben die Gespräche unter dem Dach von ZISA den Transformationsprozess beeinflusst?
4. Welche konkreten Ergebnisse sind sichtbar geworden?
5. In welcher Weise und welchem Ausmaß haben die Begegnungen Einfluss auf die individuelle Haltung/Einstellung der Interviewten gehabt?
6. Welche „lessons learned“ für andere Mediationsprozesse sind erkennbar?

1) Warum die ursprüngliche Idee nicht zum Tragen gekommen ist...

Leider war die Beantwortung dieser Fragestellungen aufgrund der vorliegenden Daten nicht möglich. Es gab verschiedene Gründe für die unzureichende Datenlage, wie z.B.:

- Das Spektrum der Interviewten war nicht repräsentativ (z.B. nur weiße männliche Akademiker der Stellenbosch Universität, VertreterInnen anderer Professionen und Hintergründe fehlten) und die Initiatoren von ZISA wurden nicht befragt.
- Es gab falsche Grundannahmen im Vorfeld. So konstatiert der Projektantrag, dass der „ZISA-Prozess zu den bislang wirksamsten internationalen Konfliktlösungsinitiativen gehört“, wobei die Untersuchung dessen selbst erst Teil des Projektes sein sollte.
- Die gegenwärtige Parteiräson des ANC ist in Bezug auf die Relevanzeinschätzung der früheren Dialogprozesse gerade sehr zurückhaltend, wovon auch die Interviews überschattet waren.

2) Was interessant an ZISA ist...

Trotz der nicht ausreichenden Datenlage gibt es einige spannende Aspekte, die sich aus den bisherigen Interviews herauskristallisiert haben. Ich werde sie im Folgenden unter den

¹ Bei meiner Untersuchung beziehe ich mich ausschließlich auf das Dialogprogramm von ZISA, nicht auf das journalistische Informationsprogramm.

spezifischen Gesichtspunkten zusammentragen, die auch bei einer qualifizierten Studie relevant gewesen wären, jedoch mit dem Unterschied, dass die hier angeführten nicht die Grundlage für „best practice“-Beispiele sind, sondern lediglich die Palette der Meinungen der Interviewten abbilden.

I. Besonderheiten von ZISA bezüglich der Rahmenbedingungen

a) Aspekte von Ownership:

Die Rolle von ZISA als eine „bloße“ Plattform für Dialoge zwischen weißen und schwarzen SüdafrikanerInnen hatte Vorteile für beide Seiten: TeilnehmerInnen und MitarbeiterInnen. Da es *keine externen Facilitators, MediatorInnen oder ModeratorInnen* gab, entthob dies laut Dr. Orbon (Abschlußbericht aus dem Jahre 1993) ZISA auch aus der Verantwortung für Erfolg oder Misserfolg seiner Veranstaltungen. Auch Prof. Dr. Lategan betont, dass ZISA keine Macht oder spezifische Position innehatte; es ging nie um Anschuldigungen, sondern immer um Dialog und zwar nicht nur zwischen SüdafrikanerInnen intern, sondern auch zwischen Leuten wie den SüdafrikanerInnen und den Russen. In diesem Sinne war es auch gemäß Ruth Weiss ein breiter Prozess, der von den beiden initiierten Parteien ANC und IDASA selbst bestimmt wurde. Vielleicht könnte man ZISA entsprechend als eine Spiegelung der Dialogprozesse im Großen auf der kleinen Ebene sehen, denn auch auf dem Track 1 wollten die südafrikanischen Parteien primär alleine ihre Sache regeln.

Auch die *Auswahl der TeilnehmerInnen* war nie durch ZISA bestimmt gewesen, vielmehr passierte nichts ohne die vorherige Absprache mit dem ANC (Dr. Orbon, André Zaaiman). Dr. Orbon erwähnt, dass es während des ersten Jahres vor allem um Treffen zwischen ANC und Repräsentanten der weißen Community, besonders vertreten durch IDASA, ging. Damals war der ANC noch sehr sensibel in Hinsicht auf ZISA, so dass viele führende ANC-Leute teilnahmen. Es kamen aber auch MitarbeiterInnen der Stellenbosch-Universität sowie viele Individuen und Organisationen auf eigene Initiative. Allerdings nahmen nach Bothas Herzinfarkt 1989 die Anfragen dermaßen zu, dass ZISA selektieren musste. Zudem erwähnte auch Prof. Erasmus, dass der ANC zu tun hatte, all die Treffen mit verschiedensten Akteuren personell zu bestreiten. André Zaaiman in seiner Rolle als Organisator der Reisen von Seiten IDASA kann sich nicht erinnern, dass jemals eine vorgeschlagene Gruppe abgelehnt wurde. Insgesamt jedoch erscheint die Zusammensetzung der TeilnehmerInnen des ZISA-Prozesses anhand der vorliegenden Interviews als relativ exklusiv im Sinne der Fokussierung auf das Treffen von vor allem weißen, mehrheitlich afrikaans-sprachigen AkademikerInnen und Mitgliedern der exilierten Freiheitsbewegungen, besonders des ANC.

b) Häufigkeit und Zusammensetzung:

Als eine Besonderheit der ZISA-Treffen erscheint es außerdem, dass es um möglichst viele Begegnungen zwischen VertreterInnen der weißen und der schwarzen Bevölkerung (vor allem ANC) Südafrikas ging und nicht um das Ermöglichen eines kontinuierlichen Dialogs zwischen den immer gleichen Teilnehmenden. So beklagte Prof. McCarthy ein wenig, dass es keine folgende Runde gab, keinen Prozess wie er ihn z.B. bei den Chatham House-Meetings in London erlebt hatte. Es scheint, als wäre es bei den ZISA-Meetings vor allem auch um die Bildung einer kritischen Masse innerhalb der Afrikaaner-Community gegangen, durch die ein Multiplikationseffekt erhofft wurde.

c) Simbabwe als Standort:

Sehr viele ehemalige TeilnehmerInnen haben Simbabwe als Ort für ihr Zusammentreffen als wichtig beschrieben. So war es für Dikgang Moseneke schon ein Motiv, die Einladung überhaupt anzunehmen. Simbabwe hat damals Hoffnung gemacht, u.a. weil es erfolgreich war, eine starke Armee und keine Angst vor dem starken Nachbarn hatte. Auch André Zaaiman beschrieb Harare als einen sehr inspirierenden, aber vor allem auch sicheren Ort, der die Möglichkeit bot, den Leuten eine andere Realität zu zeigen, eine Eigendynamik in den Köpfen auszulösen im Sinne von: als Weißer kannst Du von Schwarzen regiert und frei sein. In diesem Sinne nahmen auch Prof. Lubbe und Prof. McCarthy Simbabwe zehn Jahre nach seiner Unabhängigkeit wahr.

d) Diskretion:

Prof. Lategan hob hervor, dass ZISA seine Arbeit in einer Art und Weise gestaltete, dass sie als Afrikaner ANC-Leute treffen konnten, ohne dass sie im Nachhinein von ihrer Community angefeindet würden. Auch Ruth Weiss sagt, dass alles sehr geheim ablief. Das wahrscheinlich einzige öffentliche Dokument (Abschlusscommuniqué der JuristInnenkonferenz), das am 05. Februar 1989 in der simbabwischen Zeitung erschien, erwähnt nur Cold Comfort Farm Trust, jedoch nicht ZISA.

e) Zeitpunkt:

Dikgang Moseneke als auch Prof. Erasmus erwähnten, dass das sehr frühe Stadium der Treffen einen besonderen Wert hatte.

Bezüglich der im ZISA-Projektantrag konstatierten Rahmenbedingung des freien Agendasettings gab es jedoch abweichende Aussagen. Neben der durchaus auch üblichen Praxis, die Tagesordnung vor Ort im Konsens zwischen den Teilnehmenden zu erstellen (was ja selbst schon einen Verhandlungsprozess darstellt), gab es auch die Aussage von Prof. Groenewald, dass sein Kollege Prof. Kinghorn das Programm im Vorfeld aufgestellt habe. Gleichwohl hat keiner der Interviewten der Annahme widersprochen, dass ZISA keine Agenda vorgegeben hat.

Ein anderer, sehr unterschiedlich wahrgenommener Punkt bezieht sich auf die Ergebnisorientierung der Zusammenkünfte. Es gab Stimmen, die betonten, dass der Weg das Ziel gewesen wäre, während andere eher etwas im Unklaren darüber erschienen, welche Motivation eigentlich hinter den Treffen stand. So meinten z.B. Ruth Weiss und Prof. Lategan, es war ein „symbolisches Treffen“ bzw. die Begegnung auf menschlicher Ebene war das Ziel. Demgegenüber haben Herr Moseneke und Prof. McCarthy aber auch von einer von ihnen so empfundenen Grenze in ihren Interviews gesprochen, die mit dem Konzept der symbolischen Begegnung einhergeht. So sagte ersterer, dass es um Misstrauen wirklich zu reduzieren, einige Treffen braucht. Letzterer erwähnte die Kontinuität der Chatham House-Meetings. Einen ganz anderen Aspekt in Hinsicht auf das Ergebnis des von ihm besuchten ZISA-Treffens benannte Prof. McCarthy. Für ihn war der Eindruck entstanden, dass es eher darum ging, Verbindungen mit den simbabwischen Nachbarn (und auch Leuten aus Kuba) aufzunehmen als mit dem ANC. Daneben gab es aber auch das Communiqué von 1989 und andere, während ZISA-Treffen produzierte Dokumente, die in den Interviews erwähnt wurden. Es wurde jedoch nicht klar, ob diese bereits im Vorfeld von den TeilnehmerInnen vorbereitet wurden oder spontan entstanden.

In Hinsicht auf die Programmgestaltung war es bedingt durch den großen zeitlichen Abstand sehr schwer, genaueres zu reflektieren. Es scheinen öfters Präsentationen von beiden Seiten vorgetragen wurden zu sein (Prof. Groenewald, Dr. Orbon), aufgrund derer man dann in

Austausch trat. Anscheinend wurden variierende anschließende Workshopsettings genutzt, je nach Zusammensetzung der TeilnehmerInnen. So berichtete Herr Moseneke, dass sich die Leute in Workshops aufteilten, jedoch nicht entlang professioneller Linien sondern von Themen, wie bspw. Gender, Ökonomie und Landverteilung. Zwei der Interviewten (Frau Weiss, Prof. Lubbe) berichteten von anschließenden Plena. Als besonders wichtig empfanden Phyllis Naidoo und Dikgang Moseneke auch das informelle Zusammensein jenseits der Konferenzaktivitäten, das gemeinsame Essen und einen Drink zusammen mit dem „Feind“ zu nehmen. Unklar blieb inwieweit informelle Settings fest zur Struktur der ZISA-Meetings gehörten, also beabsichtigt waren. Auch hinsichtlich besonderer Methoden oder Regeln der Kommunikation und Vertraulichkeit (z.B. Chatham House Rule) wurde nichts angemerkt, aber auch nichts nachgefragt.

Ruth Weiss erwähnte aus der Erinnerung an ihre Teilnahme bei der Frauenkonferenz auch die routinierte Arbeit der schwarzen Frauen, die jahrelang im Exil Erfahrung in der Arbeit mit Gruppen gesammelt hatten. Hier wäre es besonders spannend gewesen, wie überhaupt innerhalb der Treffen mit gruppendynamischen Prozessen umgegangen wurde, wer an dieser Stellung Verantwortung übernommen hat und in welcher Form z.B. Widerstände aufgefangen wurden. Es gab es keine belastbaren Aussagen hinsichtlich der Anwesenheit von „Insider mediators“. Bezüglich der Einnahme von Leitungspositionen bemerkte Prof. Lubbe, dass er vor allem Thabo Mbeki als einen wahrgenommen hatte, der drauf achtete, dass die Debatte nicht zu ausufernd akademisch wurde und die TeilnehmerInnen auf den Punkt kommen, d.h. Transition und demokratische Gesellschaft. Auch den Menschenrechtsprofessor Lawrence Ackerman beschreibt er in einer starken Position.

II. Andere Aspekte aus den Interviews

Was die TeilnehmerInnen verbunden hat („Connectors“)

Bezogen auf die Frage des sogenannten „common ground“ scheint es, als hätte es unter den Teilnehmenden ein geteiltes Verständnis dafür gegeben, dass beide Seiten die Systemtransformation (und damit die Abkehr vom Apartheidsystem) als unvermeidlich betrachteten, wenn auch vielleicht aus unterschiedlichen Gründen (z.B. wirtschaftliche, wie sie Prof. McCarthy erwähnte). Allerdings gab es unterschiedliche Auffassungen zu den Fragen, wann sie eintreten wird (Prof. Lategan) und ob die weißen Südafrikaner ein Teil davon sein würden oder nicht (Frene Ginwala) und wie der Übergang gestaltet werden sollte (Dikgang Moseneke, Prof. Lubbe). Für Prof. Lategan war es auch klar, dass der ANC und die Befreiungsbewegungen die politische Führung haben werden. Zudem gab es Anknüpfungspunkte über die Profession der Beteiligten, wie z.B. beim ‚Constitutional seminar‘ oder der gemeinsamen Identität als Frau (Frauenkonferenz).

Generell erscheint es, als wären bei ZISA eher „like-minded“ als „spoiler“ zusammen gekommen.

Was die TeilnehmerInnen getrennt hat („Dividers“)

Misstrauen und Ängste haben die Begegnungen naturgemäß geprägt. Einerseits war die breit konditionierte Ansicht: ANC = Terrorismus und Kommunismus (Prof. Lategan), andererseits die allumfassenden Auswirkungen des Apartheidregimes auf das Leben der schwarzen SüdafrikanerInnen. So beschreibt Dikgang Moseneke sein massives Misstrauen und dass er sehr, sehr lange der Intention der weißen TeilnehmerInnen misstraute, denn ihm war klar, dass sie mit Leuten sprachen, die eng verbunden sind mit den Machtstrukturen in Südafrika. Auch Prof. Lategan nahm viele Spannungen und Verdächtigungen bzgl. der Intentionen wahr. Die Schwarzen waren seiner Meinung nach sehr misstrauisch über die Initiative von Afrikaaner-Seite und ob sie aufrichtig gemeint war. Prof. Groenewald erwähnte, dass er zwar keine emotionalen

Ängste, jedoch welche angesichts seiner Karriere hatte, denn er kannte einige Fälle von harten Konsequenzen für die Teilnahme an solchen Gesprächen. Ganz andere Befürchtungen hegte dagegen Prof. Erasmus in seiner Rolle als Verfassungsrechtler, angesichts der Mängel der Verfassungen anderer afrikanischer Länder und der Ängste der weißen Minderheit. Auch Prof. Lubbe erwähnte anfängliche starke Spannungen wegen der Frage der Bürgerrechte, denen jedoch Albie Sachs auch bezüglich Verunsicherungen über potentielle positive Diskriminierung (Affirmative Action) entgegnete: „One would not create one inequity to solve another.“

III. Aspekte der Wirkung von ZISA

Bezüglich der Relevanz der Gespräche gibt es unterschiedliche Einschätzungen. Mac Maharaj führt aus, dass interne und externe Krisen viel relevanter gewesen seien und Gespräche um der Gespräche willen für ihn kein produktiver Ansatz sind. Herr Moseneke betonte, dass der PAC die Strategie „talk and fight“ hatte, jedoch ZISA eine relevante Rolle dabei spielte, Diskussionen zu führen wie Veränderung anders als auf gewaltsame Weise geschehen kann. Seines Erachtens nach kamen die Gespräche nicht zum Wesentlichen, sondern es ging darum, Vorbedingungen auszuloten bevor überhaupt ein Versuch zu „talks about talks“ unternommen wird. Dem gegenüber steht Prof. Lategans Aussage, dass der Dialoge substantiell war und ins Herz der Sache ging, denn seiner Meinung nach werden Stereotypen nicht dadurch überwunden, dass man nett zueinander ist. Für ihn als Einer der davon überzeugt war, dass der ANC die Regierung übernehmen wird, war es die Rolle der Afrikaner im Gespräch den ANC daran zu erinnern, wenn sie sich etwas noch einmal genauer überlegen sollten (z.B. Nationalisierung). Für Prof. Erasmus wiederum waren die Gespräche vor allem ein Erforschen und Sondieren. Er führt aus, dass wichtig gewesen sei, dass überhaupt etwas stattfand nach dem Treffen in Dakar. ZISA machte also die Sache um einiges leichter, jedoch sollte es angesichts multipler Faktoren und Entwicklungen nicht überbewertet werden.

In Hinsicht auf Ergebnisse der Dialogveranstaltungen gab es vielfältige Rückmeldungen. Vor allem Dikgang Moseneke berichtete davon, dass ZISA dazu beigetragen hat, dass Klarheit darüber herrschte, dass es überhaupt Spielraum für weitere Diskussionen geben wird. Dabei wurde vor allem deutlich, wo die Grenzen der jeweiligen anderen Seite sind, d.h. für den PAC, dass es einen Machttransfer zur Mehrheit auf der Grundlage des „one person, one vote“-Ansatzes geben muss und dass vor jeder offiziellen Verhandlung alle politischen Gefangenen freigelassen und die verbotenen Organisationen wieder zugelassen werden müssen. Für die Weißen waren die Aufgabe des bewaffneten Kampfes, das Bekenntnis zur Bill of Rights und dem Schutz des Eigentums wichtige Vorbedingungen. Zudem kreierte ZISA eine Art Netzwerk, das dann auch wieder im Alltag genutzt werden konnte. Aus seiner Perspektive war es auch besonders wichtig, dass ZISA den Anfang der Gespräche zwischen PAC und ANC ermöglichte, wenn auch der (vor allem von der simbabwischen Regierung forcierte) Versuch der Bildung einer gemeinsamen Patriotischen Front 1991 oder 1992 scheiterte. Zudem schätzt er die Treffen in Harare als erste zwischen PAC und weißen SüdafrikanerInnen ein. Als einer derjenigen, die später die Verfassung schrieben, denkt er, dass die ZISA-Diskussionen für den weiteren Prozess eine Rolle spielten. Ohne ZISA hätte es seiner Meinung nach mehr an vorbereitenden Arbeiten zur Vertrauensbildung geben müssen.

Prof. Groenewald meint, dass die ZISA-Erfahrungen nicht seine politischen Überzeugungen verändert hätten, ihn jedoch bestärkten, weiter auf seinem Weg zu gehen und einen Beitrag zu leisten, die vorhandene Meinungshegemonie zu brechen. Er betont, dass es für sie ein Highlevel-Meeting gewesen wäre und sie (als Weiße) den Eindruck bekamen, bei etwas bedeutungsvollem dabei zu sein (Vgl. auch: Empfehlungen, 3. Schritt).

Als einen relevanten Aspekt von Dialogveranstaltungen wie u.a. ZISA betont Prof. Lategan auch, dass diese als Übungsplatz für die Vorbereitung eines alternativen Ansatzes, einer friedlichen

Problemlösung fungiert haben. Er selbst hat viele der damaligen Kontakte, vor allem zu Kollegen, aber auch zu Frank Chikane und Saki Macozoma, aufrecht erhalten.

Für Prof. Lubbe war es vor allem das Gefühl einer gewissen Sicherheit das er aus dem Treffen mitnahm in Bezug darauf, dass die andere Seite einen Rechtsstaat anstrebt, in dem Verträge und Eigentum unangetastet bleiben, es eine Bill of Rights geben wird und keine Schritte unternommen werden sollen in Richtung einer sowjetisch geprägten Zentralwirtschaft. Dieses Gefühl wurde vor allem dadurch genährt, dass er realisierte, dass die VertreterInnen der anderen Seite kompetente JuristInnen waren, die besorgt um ihr Land sind und mit denen man wirklich zusammen arbeiten kann. Er berichtet zudem von einem Produkt des Treffens, dem Abschlusscommunique der Anwesenden, das in der simbabwischen Zeitung veröffentlicht wurde (und mittlerweile auch auf der Website des ANC zu finden ist ²).

Für Prof. McCarthy kam nichts aus dem Treffen heraus, für ihn war es eine unbedeutende Veranstaltung. Er fragt sich, ob sie (als Weiße) eine Rolle dabei gespielt haben, die weißen SüdafrikanerInnen zu überzeugen.

Dr. Orbon merkte an, dass es wichtig war, dass sich die VerfassungsjuristInnen des ANC und der weißen SüdafrikanerInnen gegenseitig nicht mehr als Monster betrachteten. Er empfindet, dass das Material, das während der Konferenzen produziert wurde, in spätere Verhandlungen einfluss, wenn auch nicht 1:1. Er erwähnt auch, dass es aufgrund der vielen Konflikte auf dem späteren Verhandlungsweg (z.B. mit Inkatha) keine direkte Kontinuität geben konnte. Für ihn gibt es viele Parallelen zwischen dem ZISA-Prozess und CODESA, weil sie grundsätzlich gleich verliefen, nur auf einer anderen Ebene. Für ihn hatte das Verschwinden der eindeutigen Positionen, z.B. in Bezug auf die Apartheid, einen fundamentalen Wert. Optionen und Alternativen kamen zum Vorschein als ein Ergebnis des Dialogs. Hätte es ZISA nicht gegeben, hätten das gemeinsame Treffen und sich Kennenlernen später und in einer anderen Form stattgefunden.

Ruth Weiss schätzt ein, dass den Feind kennen zu lernen ein Teil der Bewegung Richtung Verhandlung und Lösung des Konfliktes war.

Viele der ehemaligen GesprächsteilnehmerInnen betonten, dass es die Vielzahl der damaligen Treffen und Begegnungsmöglichkeiten waren, die zusammen genommen eine Wirkung entfalteten. (Prof. Lategan, Prof. Erasmus, Frau Masekela, Frau Ginwala, Herr Zaaiman, Prof. Groenewald).

Einige der Befragten berichteten, dass die Dialoge dazu beigetragen hätten, dass ein Gefühl des Vertrauens auf persönlicher Ebene entstand, Hemmungen und Vorurteile abgebaut wurden (Prof. Lubbe), Stereotype zusammenbrachen (Prof. Lategan) oder jemand seine Meinung über einige der Anwesenden änderte (D. Moseneke). Barbara Masekela spricht nur in Bezug auf das Dakar-Treffen, nicht auf ZISA: „We realized that they were humans.“

Die Einschätzung des Einflusses auf die Regierung ist unterschiedlich. Herr Moseneke denkt, dass De Klerk und seine Kollegen Kenntnis hatten und auch deswegen die politischen Gefangenen frei gelassen und die verbotenen Organisationen wieder zugelassen worden. Prof. Lategan berichtete, dass die Sicherheitspolizei sehr interessiert war, sie jedoch keine Informationen angeboten haben. Dennoch glaubt er, dass welche indirekt nach Pretoria gelangten. Das Treffen hatte keinen Einfluss auf Pretoria, meint hingegen Prof. Groenewald.

IV. Einschätzung der Übertragbarkeit des Dialogansatzes

Mc Maharaj warnt generell davor, Theorien zur Verhandlungsführung zu entwickeln bzw. das südafrikanische Modell zu übertragen. Seiner Meinung nach braucht es keine Theorie für Dialog.

² <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/pr/1989/pr0204.html>

Prof. Groenewald denkt auch, dass man die Erfahrungen nicht direkt übertragen kann, allerdings sieht er die Möglichkeit, Erkenntnisse für eine andere Situation zu übersetzen. Laut Prof. Lubbe ist eine Generalisierung der gemachten Erfahrungen schwer möglich, weil im südafrikanischen Kontext seiner Meinung nach die moralische Frage des Transformationsprozesses eindeutig war, während es in anderen Konfliktsettings meist so sei, dass beide Seiten denken, sie befänden sich im Recht. Dikgang Moseneke sieht keinen Grund dafür, warum der Dialogansatz nicht auch in anderen Kontexten funktionieren sollte.

Abgesehen von der Datenlage die keine fundierte Einschätzung der Relevanz des ZISA-Prozesses auf die Transformation des Apartheidregimes zu einem demokratischen Staat zulässt, gibt es einige Aspekte die für Südafrika eine besondere Ausgangslage darstellen und von den Interviewten auch so benannt werden:

- Gemeinsame Identität als SüdafrikanerInnen (Frene Ginwala, André Zaaiman, Prof. Lategan, Barbara Masekela)
- Südafrikas Schlüsselrolle für die Stabilität und Entwicklung der Region (Prof. Erasmus) als auch die besondere historische Situation nach dem Ende des Kalten Kriegs
- Der Friedliche Übergang in Namibia (Prof. Lategan, Prof. Erasmus), auch als Beispiel für die Region
- Die Last der Sanktionen und wirtschaftliche Krise (Prof. McCarthy)
- Die interne Krise (Dikgang Moseneke, Mac Maharaj)
- Die klare moralische Lage (Groenewald, Lubbe).

3) Wie es weiter gehen könnte...

1. Schritt: Falls es finanzielle und personelle Ressourcen erlauben und weiterhin der Wunsch besteht, die Rolle der ZISA-Dialoge auf den Veränderungsprozess in Südafrika zu beleuchten, sollte in einem ersten Schritt ein größeres Spektrums der damals Teilnehmenden interviewt werden. Hierzu zähle ich:

- VertreterInnen des PAC,
- VertreterInnen der AZAPO,
- VertreterInnen der UDF,
- VertreterInnen der simbabwischen TeilnehmerInnen,
- VertreterInnen des ANC, besonders konkurrierende Flügel und damalige FürsprecherInnen der Einrichtung von ZISA,
- VertreterInnen von IDASA, die keine ANC-Mitglieder waren, besonders die Stimme von Alex Boraine als Mitbegründer von ZISA,
- VertreterInnen aus kirchlichen Kontexten,
- VertreterInnen der Gewerkschaften,
- VertreterInnen aus dem Bereich der Sicherheit, die damals Veranstaltungen wie ZISA beobachteten,
- VertreterInnen der Wirtschaft,
- VertreterInnen der Medien,
- VertreterInnen anderer Universitäten außer Stellenbosch.

Erst auf Grundlage dieser Einschätzungen sollten weitere Schritte überlegt werden.

2. Schritt: Liegen belastbare Indikatoren dafür vor, dass VertreterInnen eines breiteren Spektrums dem Dialogprogramm wichtige Auswirkungen für den Transformationsprozess beimessen³,

³ Das heißt z.B. eine überwiegende Einschätzung der Relevanz durch die Befragten mit 2 gemäß den Kriterien im Anhang.

könnte ein nächster Forschungsschritt darin bestehen, VertreterInnen anderer Dialogprozesse (früherer und späterer, formeller und informeller) auf den verschiedensten Verhandlungsebenen zu befragen und/oder eine umfangreiche Recherche zu anderen Dialogprozessen zu unternehmen, um innerhalb der multiplen damaligen Bemühungen einer Verhandlungslösung, ZISA einen Platz zuweisen zu können.

Dieser Schritt ergibt sich auch aus der Einschätzung vieler der bisher befragten Personen, die meinten, dass es die Vielzahl der Prozesse waren, die eine Wirkung erzeugten. Die Frage des „Wie?“ hinsichtlich der Vernetzung dieser verschiedenen Initiativen scheint diesbezüglich ein Forschungsgegenstand sein zu können. Als hilfreiche Instrumente für die Erschließung der Lücken innerhalb der Wirkungszusammenhänge könnten u.a. die Reflecting on Peace Practice-Matrix genutzt werden oder Elemente des Movement Action Plan.

3. Schritt: Wenn ZISA innerhalb der verschiedenen Verhandlungsbemühungen ein relevanter Platz zugewiesen werden konnte, gäbe es potentiell sicherlich noch einige daraus resultierende interessante Fragestellungen. Eine mögliche Richtung solch einer Frage könnte sich auf die Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Aktivitäten auf unterschiedlichen Verhandlungsebenen beziehen (Multi-track-diplomacy) und speziell in Hinsicht auf ZISA: auf die Auswirkungen eines Machtungleichgewichts bezüglich der Zusammensetzung der an ZISA-Dialogen Beteiligten. Das meint, dass die Mehrzahl der weißen SüdafrikanerInnen entweder aus einem intellektuellem Umfeld oder aus der Oberschicht stammten, jedoch nur sehr begrenzt mit Machtzugang oder politischem Mandat ausgestattet waren (Track 2 – Track 3). Im Gegenzug dazu waren VertreterInnen der ANC-Elite anwesend, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon zumindest als Track 1,5 wahrgenommen werden konnten⁴.

Eine Fragestellung diesbezüglich könnte entsprechend lauten:

- Hatten Dialogveranstaltungen zwischen VertreterInnen unterschiedlicher Track-Ebenen wie ZISA einen Effekt von „power elevation“ im Sinne ihrer kumulativ legitimierenden (und nicht kontinuierlichen) Effekte für Track 1-Zugänge? Wenn ja, unter welchen Bedingungen?

⁴ Vgl. Daniel Lieberfeld „Track-two diplomacy in South Africa“, in: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May 2002), S. 357.

A. Liste der interviewten Personen

Dr. Helmut Orbon

Justice Dikgang Moseneke

Frene Ginwala

Barbara Masekela

Gerhard Erasmus

Johann Groenewald

Bernhard Lategan

G.F. Lubbe

Colin McCarthy

Phyllis Naidoo

Sathyandranath Ragunanan 'Mac' Maharaj

Ruth Weiss

Andre Zaaimann

B. Liste der kontaktierten Personen

Thabo Mbeki

Moeletsi Mbeki

Hugh Lewin

Hubertus von Welck

Allister Sparks

Johann Kinghorn

Jaques du Plessis

Stephan Ohme

Derek Hanekom

Pallo Jordan

Vally Moosa

Jeannette Groenewald

Albie Sachs

Alex Boraine

Sampie Terblanche

Musibude Mangena

Peta Thornicroft

Dr. Freiherr von Ropp

Dr. Raichle

Francis Antonie

Tanja Shanker

Dennis Goldberg

Khwezi Kadalie

C. Questions to anti-apartheid participants on ZISA

Name and position of interviewed person:

I. Before the meetings

1. Who invited you to attend a meeting or meetings in Harare?
2. Who informed you about the topics?
3. Of which organisations were you a member at the time?
4. Who proposed the meeting as well as subject matter for discussion and worked out the agenda?
5. Which meeting(s) did you attend?
6. Did you fully approve of a negotiated settlement before the meeting?

II. At the meetings

7. What did you expect from ZISA's coordinators?
8. Who was chairing the meeting?
9. What did you expect from the meeting?
10. Were there taboo-topics?
11. Was there any follow up with the conclusion?

III. Outcome of the meetings:

12. Did the meeting make you realise what the effect of a successful outcome of negotiations would mean for your party and yourself?
13. Did you find any common ground with the opposing side?
14. Did you discuss pre-conditions to negotiations?
15. Did your experience affect your friends and comrades?

16. Did you subsequently discuss your experiences with your party officials?

17. Did any of the views expressed serve as input into the subsequent official talks?

IV. Personal Reflections

With hindsight, can you evaluate the meeting(s) as follows:

18. Did these change your perception of the opposing party or individuals?

19. Did you develop any kind of relationship with any individual?

20. Did the meeting reduce any fears you may have had previously?

21. Did you think that stumbling blocks could be removed to enable negotiations to proceed?

22. Did any of the issues discussed form an input subsequently in talks about talks, negotiations or legislation? If so, in which way?

23. Were you interested in Zimbabwe as a newly independent state?

24. If the ZISA-meetings would not have taken place, would that have effected the negotiating process?

25. Looking back: Would you think that other conflict resolution processes could benefit from similar approaches?

26. Would you be interested to discussing your views with other professionals in civil peace work?

D. Questions to white South African participants

Name and position of interviewed person:

I. Before the meeting:

1. Who invited you to participate in meetings in Harare organised by ZISA?
2. Did you have a vision of the outcome?
3. Who proposed the meeting as well as subject matter for discussion and worked out the agenda?
4. At which meeting(s) did you participate?

II: At the meeting:

5. Were there any topics left out? Were there any taboos?
6. What did you expect from ZISA's coordinators?

III. Outcome of the meeting

7. What was the outcome of the meetings?
8. Was it followed up?
9. In which way?

IV: Personal Reflections:

With hindsight, can you evaluate the meeting (s) as follows:

11. Did these change your perception of the opposing party or individuals?
12. Did you develop any kind of relationship with any individual?
13. Did the meeting reduce any fears you may have had previously?
14. Did the meeting make you realise what the effect of a successful outcome of negotiations would mean for South Africa in general and yourself in particular?

15. Did you find any common ground with the opposing side?
16. Did you discuss pre-conditions to negotiations?
17. Did you think that stumbling blocks could be removed to enable negotiations to proceed?
18. Did your experience affect public opinion in South Africa?
19. Did you subsequently discuss your experiences with Pretoria officials?
20. Did any of the views expressed serve as input into the subsequent official talks?
21. Were you aware of other initiatives of talks for instance at Mells Park?
22. With hindsight, do you think the meetings contributed to the transformation?
23. Were you interested in Zimbabwe as a newly independent state?
24. Are you interested to discuss your experience with other experts on civil peace programmes?